In mid-July, Italian Carabinieri officials arrested a cell of four individuals on terrorism charges (source). The four reportedly belong to the Algerian group Salafist Group for Call and Combat and were arrested in Brescia, Reggio Emilia, and Vicenza, which is said to be the home of the group’s Italian headquarters. They were arrested for financing, recruitment, and the procurement of false IDs, documents, and work permits for immigrants for terrorist purposes. Allegedly, the men were planning to carry out attacks in Italy or abroad (source), and some press has also reported that the individuals were in the midst of preparations to go to Algeria and Iraq (source). With some 3,000 troops in Iraq, Italy finds itself squarely in the line of fire with al-Qaeda and other Islamist terrorist groups.
GSPC is largely known for its logistical support capabilities, mainly regarding the manufacturing of all kinds of false documents. They provide a means for people seeking to move and work unnoticed throughout Italy and Europe, and evidence indicates that the group acted as a logistical base also for al-Qaeda operatives. While some experts suggest that the relationship between the two groups is rather insignificant and more based on opportunistic purposes, other analysts caution for GSPC’s increased strive to grow from a primarily nationalist group (concerned with bringing down the secular Algerian government) to a Jihadist group with global aims?an effort to bring their agenda more into line with global groups like al-Qaeda.
TRC has highlighted the group’s growing terrorism aspirations in evolving from a remote nationalist group to an international Jihadist player (Terror Web Watch). Algerians, including those who used to sympathize with the group, are worn-out by the violence in their country and anxious to move away from its terrorism-laden past, so the majority of Algerians join the Algerian government in denouncing violence. As GSPC’s domestic insurgency grows weaker in Algeria and loses its popular support along with its rationale, a new international direction is afoot. This is mirrored in an increasing number of Islamist extremist website statements, particularly on their own online publication al-Jama’a (Terror Web Watch). In addition to the commonly seen propaganda of videos, documentation of attacks in Algeria and leadership comments, an overt endeavor to support superior groups of the same Salafist strain (mainly al-Qaeda) is emerging. In doing this they appear to want to: 1.) seek money and support from bigger actors in the global Jihad movement, and 2.) secure a more prominent role in the international playing field.
As increased attention is paid to Europe and its emerging threats from radical movements, the GSPC ought to be watched. In April 2005, a GSPC member, Kamel Bourgass, was convicted in the UK for “conspiracy to cause public nuisance by use of poisons and/or explosives” ? a notorious ricin plot (source). Although many deemed the threat in this case to be exaggerated, Bourgass was clearly linked to London-based GSPC cell leader Abu Doha. Doha, in turn, has links to Osama bin Laden and has been suspected for involvement in the plot to blow up the Los Angeles International Airport . Because of these incidents and others, the GSPC is likely reaching international sophistication, allowing them to carry out an attack on western soil that could encompass an economic and symbolic target to gain acclaim from the international Jihadist community.
