Recent attacks in Iraq bearing hallmarks of sectarian ethnic-religious targeting; a recent communiqu? by Osama bin Laden calling on Iraq’s Sunnis to retaliate against the Shia (see this WAR Report); and Iraqi government findings that an al-Qaeda in Iraq cell conducted last February’s bombing of the Shia shrine in Samarra have all underscored the threat of civil war in Iraq. Of particular note is what seems to be a renewed focus among the jihadist camp on a strategy of striking at Iraq’s Shia-dominated government and its primary constituency: the larger Shia community. The strategic rationale for such a campaign centers largely on seeking to undermine the security, stability, writ, and perceived competency of the government, provoke Shia retaliation against the Sunni community, and stoke civil war. The strategy of the latter was a prevailing contour of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s stewardship of al-Qaeda in Iraq’s militant campaign that may have succeeded in setting in motion the dynamics of sectarian conflict and generating the momentum of a cascading sectarian revenge attacks.
Amid the political backdrop of the al Maliki government’s attempts to gather support and energy for its national reconciliation plan?featuring attempts to broker rapprochement between some insurgents and the government and between rival Shia and Sunni communities, but which has drawn criticism from some Sunni leaders for not going far enough in reaching out to Sunni insurgents or addressing core Sunni communal interests?a steady drumbeat of sectarian attacks was punctuated this weekend by a large scale bombing in the predominantly Shia Sadr City neighborhood of Baghdad . The attack killed as many as 77 and wounded as many as 96 and, as a well-known Shia neighborhood and stronghold of the Shia rebel nationalist cleric and militia leader Moqtada al Sadr, was likely designed to kill not only Iraqi Shia, but also provoke a militant riposte by Shia militias against Sunnis, as well as timed to exacerbate sectarian animosity and passions during a sensitive period of political machinations. The attack was claimed by the Sunni Supporters a previously unknown group. While the group may indeed be an emergent Sunni insurgent grouping, a name so obviously positioning the group within the Sunni camp may also be an intentional effort by jihadists to tar Sunni insurgents with responsibility and draw Shia retaliation against the Sunni community. Further underscoring a pattern of attack indicators suggesting a campaign by jihadists of seeking to stoke civil war were the recent Iraqi government findings that, according to the Iraq’s National Security Advisor, Mowaffak al-Rubaie, it was an al Qaeda in Iraq cell which carried out the bombing of a revered Shia shrine in Samarra in February?an attack that served as a pivotal flashpoint launching the continuing cascading spiral of sectarian attacks. As quoted by the Washington Post, al-Rubaie said that “The sole reason behind his action was to drive a wedge between the Shia and Sunnis and to ignite and trigger a sectarian war in this country.”
In a recent communiqu?, Osama bin Laden addresses sectarian and insurgency issues in Iraq. Bin Laden exhorts Iraq’s Sunnis not to participate in politics or negotiate with the al Maliki government, and, in a significant revision to earlier al Qaeda strategic contours of avoiding sectarian conflict, bin Laden calls upon Sunnis to fight back against the Shia in Iraq, who he calls, as reported by CNN, “rejectionist,” “traitors” and “agents of the Americans.” Further, as reported by CNN, bin Laden says that the only way for Sunnis to avoid annihilation in Iraq and win their freedom is by “holding on to their jihad” and forcing out the occupying powers.
By seeking to dissuade Sunnis from negotiating with the government, exhorting them to retaliate against the Shia and fight the “occupying” power within the framework of jihad lest they face annihilation, coupled with attacks against the Shia community to provoke retaliation against Sunnis, it would seem that al Qaeda and its associated jihadist groupings are pursuing a strategy of attempting to craft an environment in Iraq perceived by Sunnis as one of Shia government and militia threat to Sunnis and with it the diminished prospects of Sunni political empowerment within Iraq’s political landscape, and an Islamic/jihadist justification for anti-government violence. These efforts seem aimed at cajoling, coercing, and consolidating Sunnis into a more square support for insurgent activities against the government and the Shia community and its militias, potentially in greater operational collaboration with the jihadist camp of the insurgency. The result of this manipulation of the insurgency would be the further entrenching of the largely Sunni-dominated insurgency against a Shia-dominated government, bracketed at both extremes of the two camps by more unbridled violent inciting elements in the form of jihadists on the extreme end of the insurgency camp, and recalcitrant and rogue Shia militias on the extreme end of the Shia-government camp. With the jihadists and sectarian militias acting as the driving militant catalysts of sectarian and insurgent violence?the jihadists provoking conflict, the Shia militias seemingly eager to conduct vendetta offensives against Sunnis, and Sunni militias and insurgents fighting on a number of fronts against the government, foreign powers, and the Shia militias?the ingredients for an upsurge in insurgent and sectarian violence seems to have been mixed to a potent cocktail.
Should attacks against the Shia community by jihadists, or Sunni insurgents continue, juxtaposed with a reconciliation plan which some Sunni leaders believe does not go far enough in addressing Sunni concerns and interests, the potential is increased for the Sunni community and its landscape of insurgent groupings to become disillusioned with prospects of national reconciliation, the realization of Sunni political interests and goals, and the durable safeguarding of Sunni communal security vis-?-vis the present national government and political structure. With this development would also come the increased potential that the Sunni community and its insurgent groupings would swing more squarely to support and participate in the insurgency, possibly in greater collaboration with jihadist militants, and a more aggressive engagement of menacing Shia militias?all of which would bolster the operational capabilities and vigor of the insurgency, as well as hasten the momentum of sectarian conflict.
