In a dramatic departure from its previous policy, the US has agreed to join its European allies in direct negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program, should Iran cease the uranium enrichment process. The decision by the Bush Administration potentially reverses 27 years of consistent US policy barring official contact with the Islamic Republic of Iran, born from the riotous takeover of the US Embassy in Tehran and the subsequent hostage crisis that followed Iran?s 1979 Revolution. The US offer arrives in conjunction with a package of incentives and disincentives presented to Tehran and crafted by the E-3 (France , Germany , and Great Britain ) under the direction of the US, Russia , and China . Cumulatively, the momentous diplomatic effort is designed to convince Tehran to cease uranium enrichment and return to the negotiating table and alternatively outlines the penalties for refusing to do so.
To a large extent, the momentum of the international debate over the Iranian nuclear program rests on who is effectively framing the issue. Tehran has adamantly denied having any interest in developing a nuclear weapon, and consistently reminded the global community that its pursuit of nuclear energy is a legal and indelible right. The issue, according to Iran, is that the US led Western powers are intent on denying technological progress to an independent minded Muslim country. Capitalizing on their region?s shared experience, the US effort to derail Iran?s nuclear energy program has been portrayed as an imperial venture; a push to manipulate events in less developed countries to its own advantage. As Iranian President Ahmadinejad stated in his well received visit to Indonesia, ?We are not only defending our rights, we are defending the rights of many other countries?By maintaining our position, we are defending our independence? (source).
As Tehran has effectively expanded the scope of the issue to include their own nationalist struggle, a historic regional struggle against imperialism, and American mal-intentions, the significance of the US offer is that it refocuses the issue back on Iran and its nuclear program. By offering to join the negotiations and support a package that includes incentives, the US is demonstrating its commitment to diplomacy and placing the responsibility for any future outcome onto Iran. The diplomatic overture essentially relates to Tehran: If you are solely interested in civilian nuclear energy, cease uranium enrichment (a step mandated by the IAEA) and we can negotiate a just settlement; or refuse the offer and implicitly admit to the world your true intention of building a nuclear weapon. In the near term, the US decision to commit to negotiations was pivotal for maintaining the fragile coalition currently aligned against an Iranian nuclear weapons program. Moreover, exhausting the diplomatic options lays the groundwork for garnering international support in the event coercive measures ? sanctions, military strikes ? are required .
As TRC analysis has previously suggested, the two key actors in this drama have been and continue to be Russia and China ? both veto wielding members of the UN Security Council. Maintaining critical energy partnerships with Tehran and guided by foreign policies that do not deviate from self-interest, Russia and China have consistently rejected the use of sanctions against Iran. Despite their participation in the joint authorship of the ?package? offered to Iran, the fissure in the coalition still exists. In revealing comments, the Chinese ambassador stated the US offer should have included security assurances and dropped the demand that Iran cease uranium enrichment. Likewise, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov conspicuously failed to mention any of the outlined disincentives during his announcement of the proposal offered to Iran. It is likely, therefore, that Iran?s eventual response to the diplomatic initiative will exploit this fissure, possibly taking small steps that placate Russia and China yet fall short of completely stopping their uranium enrichment activities.
