After a successful Islamic revolution was completed in Iran , certain members of the new Iranian regime sought to provoke sectarian confrontations in surrounding countries, among them Saudi Arabia . Relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran disintegrated, worsened significantly by suspicions that Iran may have had a role in a 1979 terrorist attack in which 200 militants seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca . Only 20 years later was there something of a warming between the two countries, after the Iran-Iraq war was long over and after Iranian ambitions to export revolution to the Gulf seemed to have calmed.
Now, Iran is back in the business, in a way, of supporting Shia revolutions, this time in Iraq. Saudi Arabia is again concerned. This time, it is not so much the fear that Iran will provoke Saudi?s own Shia population; it is that Iran will fulfill long-held ambitions to become a regional hegemon. The leaders of Persia, and later, Iran, have seen their nation as destined for a position of regional political dominance, either through empire or influence. Iran is about to be better positioned than any other time in recent history to achieve this goal. It has now infiltrated the regime of the one country that had been a stumbling block for years?Iraq?may soon join the nuclear club. It is this big picture that threatens the Saudis.
But, there is not very much that the Saudis can do. The nuclear issue is in the hands of governments that have the ability to exert effective pressure on Iran, those of the United States and Europe, as well as certain international organizations. On the Iraq front, the Saudis have more options, but none would be truly effective for ameliorating Iranian influence in Iraq. Providing funding to Sunni militias is an option, and this could protect Sunnis from some of the violence allegedly being inflicted upon them by vengeful Shia. However, it is unlikely that a flow of Saudi money into Sunni tribes could affect the political dynamic significantly enough to decrease the Iranian influence exerted through the Shia community.
Because of tribal ties connecting Saudi and Iraqi families, there will probably be private money going from Saudi into Iraq in order to help fellow tribal members protect themselves. Government money, funneled through certain vehicles, could follow. The Saud regime may be reluctant to do this, however, out of the fear that money may end up in the hands of Sunni terrorist/insurgent groups who could later set their sites on Saudi targets. For now, the Saudi government will wait and hope that the US will take care of the situation and that it will not be faced with the daunting and unwanted task of proactively interfering to protect or bolster Iraqi Sunnis.
Saudi Arabia has so far made some effort to silence calls for Saudis to travel to Iraq to fight Jihad. However, as news of Shia death squads targeting Sunni families spreads, along with the perception that one of the primary outcomes of the US-led invasion has been Sunni disenfranchisement, it will become harder for the Saud government to argue that Saudis and other Arabs should not send financial support or men to Iraq to help protect their Sunni brethren from what are seen as rampaging Shia.
Sunni militias will crop up in Iraq for the expressed purpose of protection from the Shia. They will not characterize themselves as insurgents, and it will be difficult for the Saudi government to oppose funding for such groups, even if the reality is that there is little distinction between these defensive militias and the insurgents. It is in such situations that a two-sided conflict becomes more complicated, turning into a multi-front conflict zone and making the identification of good guys and bad guys difficult.
This is the situation that will probably develop in Iraq, for the simple fact that the state cannot provide security. Militias will come into existence to help to protect the survival of certain groups defined by tribe, neighborhood, or religious division. This is often the outcome of war zones that become anarchic. For both the occupier and for neighboring countries, this can make a tough situation almost impossible. The interference of a strong, outside power willing to stay in the country and aid in the consolidation of power under a single governing entity can help stabilize this situation. Saudi Arabia?s dilemma is that it hoped that this outside power would be the US, but it fears that it could be Iran.
Aside from the money that will probably flow from Saudi tribes to Iraqi counterparts, Saudi Arabia will probably do nothing. It cannot support an Arab Jihad in Iraq to protect the Sunnis, and it does not have the ability or desire to infiltrate and support the Sunni community in the way that Iran is doing with segments of the Shia community. Able to do little to help the problem, Saudi Arabia will only pour resources into its border security , walling off Iraq in an effort to stop the problem from spreading.