Somalia has struggled through at least 14 attempts to form a government since dictator Mohamed Siad Barre was overthrown by warlords in 1991. The result has been a stateless-state (aka failed state) in which rival tribes operate in a feudal society dominated by ruthless warlords competing for territory and resources primarily in Mogadishu and other port cities. The most recent provisional transitional government was established in the sanctuary of neighboring Kenya in 2004. President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, heading a cabinet of 42 members and consults with a parliament assembly of 275 representatives, moved the legislature to Baidoa in 2005, approximately 155 miles (250 km) northwest of Mogadishu.
In recent years, the more radical Muslim warlords began establishing Islamic courts in some quarters of Mogadishu that they controlled, facilitating a level of security and justice not seen since the late 1980s. In response, secular, moderate, and non-Muslim warlords joined the transitional government, which has secured UN and other international backing. Yet, by keeping in mind the maxim that politics is about territory, some cabinet warlords are holding off the final move from Baidoa to Mogadishu until they have carved out significant territories in the capital and, perhaps, have rolled back the inroads made by the Muslim warlords. This Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism (ARPCT) was formed in February 2006 and is believed to be funded at least partially by the United States ?perhaps in violation of an international arms embargo on the country. As it stands now, recent reports of skirmishes and full-fledged engagements across Mogadishu and the nearby countryside pit the ARPCT against the Islamic Courts Union , which is comprised of 11 warlord militias.
The ARPCT speaks as though it were influenced significantly by US policy. One of its spokesmen, Hussain Gutaleh Rageh, is quoted in the popular press that fighting was “good for the government…We are paving the way for the smooth arrival of the government in Mogadishu.” He further clarified that “We are not fighting against the Islamic courts per se, but hunting for foreign terrorists who belong to Al-Qaeda [Group Profile].” Rageh has identified Zuweydan by name as the preeminent al-Qaeda agent given protection by the Islamic Courts Union militia. Zuweydan is believed to be a senior planner in the 1998 US Embassy bombings in both Kenya and Tanzania and the coordinated attacks again on Kenya in 2002 (Terrorist Incident and Terrorist Incident). Additionally, Ragheh claims to have evidence in the form of bodies of foreign militants killed while fighting alongside Islamic Courts Union militia, suggesting further credibility to ARPCT’s stated goals. “Foreigners were fighting alongside the local terrorists and were killed” including Arabs and suspected Pakistanis, Sudanese, and Muslim Oromo fighters from Ethiopia , Ragheh stated.
If such a relationship between ARPCT and US agents does exist, it is certainly a marriage of convenience and not likely to last long. A US anti-terror task force based in nearby Djibouti has no authority to operate in Somalia unless some recognized legal authority invites them in. At this point, President Abdullahi’s transitional government is not inclined to extend the invitation, so the ARPCT warlords are betting that they can gain enough control in Mogadishu to pave the way for the arrival of the transitional government and eliminate the threat of foreign militants by strikes against the Islamic Court Union militias. If Sudan were not heading down the path toward Afghanistan of the 1990s and Iraq since 2003 serving as the flame attracting jihadi moths before now, the emergence of the ARPCT might provide the spark necessary to light that path.
