On May 28, 2006, Colombian President Alvaro Uribe was reelected overwhelmingly to the presidency, securing a better than expected 62 percent of the popular vote. Pundits largely contribute this unprecedented victory to the substantial decrease in criminal and terrorist activity in Colombia since 2002 and the reinvigoration of the Colombian economy?a feat largely attributable to record levels of US military and economic assistance. However, a closer examination reveals a country in flux, alternating between civil war and democratic-capitalistic growth, with international observers not yet sure in which direction the state might head. What is determinable, however, is the awesome power Uribe has acquired in four years and his usage of such power to generate a “successful” conclusion to disarmament talks with Colombia’s largest paramilitary group, the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) . Granting the AUC a controversial de facto amnesty, Uribe’s second term rests largely on the peaceful reintegration of AUC forces into the general populace, while curtailing their illicit narcotics enterprises.
Uribe, throughout the campaign, cited the demobilization of more than 30,000 paramilitary fighters as a key success in ameliorating the lives of Colombians. Local and international human rights groups, however, continue to wonder if demobilization came at far too great a price. Critics have condemned the agreed upon framework law as too lenient toward militia leaders accused of drug trafficking and civilian massacres . The framework law, as passed by the Colombian Congress, calls for AUC members found guilty of crimes against humanity to serve five- to eight-year prison terms, minus credits for good behavior and time spent negotiating. Imprisonment would likely be in some form of “house arrest” in a rural hacienda, similar to the house arrest of renowned drug lord Pablo Escobar. Additionally, disarmed paramilitary fighters would not be subject to extradition agreements with the United States , as membership in a paramilitary group was declared a “political crime” (see the May 17, 2006 Intel Report concerning the AUC disarmament framework).
The Colombian populace granted Uribe considerable leeway throughout the demobilization process, believing leniency was far better than a continued two front war. However, like Uribe and the Colombian Congress, Colombians believed AUC paramilitary personnel would reintegrate peacefully into the general populace, curtailing past nefarious activities. As recent events now indicate, however, factions within the AUC have chosen to continue their war against alleged leftist subversives.
As reported by Amnesty International, paramilitary groups have sent several death threats to prominent human rights organizations that work on issues relating to communities forcibly displaced by the armed conflict in Colombia. The group, Colombia Libre de Comunistas (Colombia Free of Communists), is thought to have the backing the Colombian military, not an unprecedented occurrence in Colombia, as paramilitary groups and the Colombian military have routinely worked in conjunction. The threat was sent via email to 20 organizations working in Colombia and warns “you are going to know something more about us now that we are to continue in power?along with the legitimate Colombian armed forces clearing our countryside and cities of grovellers like you.” Human rights organizations are frequently labeled as guerrilla collaborators by paramilitary units and are targeted for assassination or forced disappearance.
Amnesty agreements are predicated on the belief that it is impossible to eliminate all terrorists, necessitating a means of enticing terrorists to terminate their connections to the group. Franco Ferracuti, professor of criminological medicine and of forensic psychiatry at the University of Rome, suggests the state must encourage dissent within the terrorist group and the defection from it, providing a way out. Ferracuti believes this is best achieved by providing a place within the country’s political system for members of society with dissenting views. Unfortunately, Ferracuti’s writing was referencing ideological terrorism in general and leftist terrorism in particular. The AUC is neither ideological per se nor leftist in nature. Although generally labeled as right wing, the AUC paramilitary has maturated into a narco-trafficking syndicate with certain limited elements remaining devoted to the elimination of leftist guerrillas but emphatically engaged in the pursuit of profit.
Ferracuti, referencing the Italian government’s success in alluring Red Brigade members to defect, believed a lenient and flexible judicial system would facilitate this exit. However, such amnesties may not be so successful for the Colombian government, as the AUC has a historical role within Colombian politics, eliminating the allure of political participation. Rather than offering political participation, Uribe must allow for the possibility of extradition to the US if AUC members do not discontinue narcotics operations. By allowing for such possibilities, Uribe provides the incentive to abide by disarmament and reintegration agreements. Further, Uribe must adamantly inform AUC personnel that any rearmament or continuation of narco-operations will result in the elimination of the agreed upon framework law. Without such threats, AUC remobilization is likely occur in the near-term.
