Western students of politics and international affairs are often wide-eyed optimists regarding international law and the international community in general. Reviewing the case of Joseph Kony and his cultish terrorist group, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) , is particularly instructive regarding how international organizations and institutions that are created by and for state governments cannot always live up to their charters and mandates to protect individuals and groups in remote sub-state regions. After a 20-year insurgency, the LRA is responsible for tens of thousands of deaths, the abductions of some 25,000 children for use as soldiers, porters, and sex slaves, and the displacement of at least 1.6 million people across Uganda , Sudan , and eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) . Now, in early 2006 Ugandan forces have at least twice located Kony and his deputy commander Vincent Otti?two of four LRA leaders sought for international crimes?in southern Sudan and eastern DRC, but those weak (and in the case of Sudan, particularly despotic) governments that cannot control their border nonetheless deny any sort of “hot pursuit” agreement that gives Ugandan forces permission to cross their borders to capture members of the LRA. The international community supports the sovereignty of the weak states, and, thus, the battle-hardened rogue leaders escape to sanctuaries in lawless neighboring countries.
Aid workers, relief organizations, and even the Ugandan authorities are coming to the realization that total liquidation of the LRA is not the optimal solution to the problem. As the ranks of the group have been decimated in recent years from over 5,000 to an estimated 500-1,000, engaged security forces of all countries are realizing that the LRA cells, squads, gangs, and larger groups are comprised primarily of child-soldiers. In fact, nearly all refugee communities include mothers and families who have lost at least one child to LRA abductions and who, without knowledge of the children’s safety, plead for security forces to refrain from actions against the deadly group. Senior refugee and relief coordinators emphasize that deprogramming these juvenile militants after some sort of ceasefire and peace settlement will need to be particularly nuanced to avoid a return to violent gangs of another guise.
Bearing these considerations in mind?both the significant decline in LRA numbers and the disproportionate number of child militants?Ugandan officials are openly considering a pact with the LRA leadership: Kony and his coterie must relocate to Uganda permanently and agree to end the 20-year conflict by July 2006 in exchange for his safety and security in the face of the international community. Kony, Otti, and two others are wanted by the new International Criminal Court (ICC) for war crimes. Since Uganda is a signatory to the ICC, it is obliged to turn over suspects to the court once in control of the suspects. To stick to its proposed peace offering to the LRA, Uganda would face international condemnation and possibly even some sort of sanctions. On the other hand, Uganda’s motives and actions over the past 20 years in countering this insurgency and relating to its neighbors have not been without severe criticism; thus, the leadership does not feel particularly threatened by a collective international frown.
In the meantime, however, it appears that international law and the international community are largely ineffective in protecting the civilians who have been victimized in this conflict for over two decades, and further, both are actively hindering and threatening Uganda’s efforts to secure a pact that would limit, if not eliminate, the LRA threat, making the dismantling of the group a sovereign “internal” affair free of outside interference. In sum, at least in the case of the LRA across the Great Lakes region of Africa, students of global events quickly learn that international institutions that are founded upon the principle of supporting the sovereignty (right of autonomous self administration) of even the weakest states not only hinder the resolution of nagging humanitarian crises, but can exacerbate those tragedies. Perhaps in this case, all would be better served if Kony and his leadership cadre were permanently retired by any means necessary?even peacefully without the sanction of global justice bestowed by the International Criminal Court.