The strategy of disrupting the energy infrastructure is well known worldwide. A current bias might be that such a plan is a comparatively new phenomenon tied to Middle East terrorism and the west’s reliance on Arab oil. Recent publicized al-Qaeda communiqu?s emphasizing their campaign targeting oil facilities (Terror Web Watch) and the global economy strengthen that misperception. However, the practice has been conducted for decades by such prominent groups as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) targeting oil pipelines in Colombia , Al Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula targeting oil refineries in Saudi Arabia , Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) hitting power pilons and transformers in Peru , the Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA) striking natural gas pipelines in Pakistan , and most recently Nigerian militants such as mobs of Ijaw Youth and sophisticated hostage-taking operations executed by the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) . With that in mind, observers may conclude that a strategy against energy infrastructure is the hallmark of massive, well-known, and popularly supported militant movement acting upon a finite target list. Regrettably, the terrorist insurgent movement in the remote northeastern province of Assam in India decisively counters that assumption.
The United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) is the preeminent group among an estimated 25 militant factions that currently engage authorities in the seemingly lawless state. Other prominent arms-bearing groups operating in Assam include: the United Peoples’ Democratic Solidarity (UPDS), the Dima Halam Daoga (DHD), the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) , the All Tripura Tiger Force , the Manipur People’s Liberation Front and the Kamatapur Liberation Organization. ULFA’s anti-government autonomy/independence struggle began in 1970 and the subsequent insurgency has resulted in more than 10,000 deaths and as many as 40,000 people internally displaced. As such, news that authorities capture a ranking ULFA leader?Mrinal Hazarika?has significant impact especially because Hazarika’s detention signals the loss of a second key ULFA leader in two weeks following the death of ULFA’s western zone commander, Lal Deka, in a skirmish with security forces in late April 2006.
Nonetheless, developments in Assam have considerable impact on regional stability and security of the energy infrastructure. ULFA’s modus operandi over recent years has been to marry mass political protest and demonstrations with selected surgical strikes against utilities, a plot designed to apply the maximum pressure on the remote outpost governors of Assam and to drive a wedge between the populace and the government. In recent years, ULFA has called for widespread public strikes and protests on two prominent federal holidays: Republic Day on January 26 and Independence Day on August 15. Over the last two years, ULFA has coordinated a series of terrorist attacks leading up to those protests, including bombings of state-owned electricity transmission towers and state-run Oil India Ltd. pipelines and pumping stations (Terrorist Incidents forthcoming). Prior to Independence Day 2005, ULFA was responsible for attacks against a wide range of infrastructure targets including gas and oil pipelines , railway lines, and electric power facilities. The loss of power and resources affects nearby states such as West Bengal and the international port city of Calcutta. Additionally, armed militants of ULFA and other Assam groups frequently traverse remote porous borders with Myanmar (Burma) and Bangladesh for sanctuary and resources further destabilizing these challenged communities. In sum, the energy infrastructure is an attractive target for insurgents both large and small and is not the preserve of just Middle East jihadists and other global actors. Rather, smaller, less internationally significant groups are striking out at energy vulnerabilities with increasing effect. As such, risk analysts and security specialists should not discount ULFA and its ilk as viable and relevant to operations in South Asia.