For several years, the E-3 (the UK , France , and Germany ) has acted as the ?good cop? participant in the Iranian nuclear negotiations, while the ?bad cop? US kept its distance?recognizing the process but posturing belligerently behind its European allies. The approach has failed; China and Russia have blocked the threat of UN sanctions , and an undaunted Tehran has proceeded to limit the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections and continue work on enriching uranium. The dilemma has sparked debate among government and congressional officials, international figures, and policy experts as to whether the US should communicate directly with Iran , in either a bi-lateral or multi-lateral format. Ultimately, a hard-line policy toward Tehran?one that ensures a non-weapons nuclear capability?is facilitated by direct US participation in the Iranian nuclear negotiations.
The argument against the US’s direct involvement in negotiations, the current position of the Bush administration, has strong merits. First, they hold that there is nothing new to negotiate: the demands and incentives of the US government have been made clear. Additionally, Iran?s recent enthusiasm for renewed discussions is insincere and a predictable ploy to stall and weaken the will of the international community. Second, Iran is defying the UN and has circumvented its obligations as a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The issue is Iran?s malfeasance, regardless of the direct or indirect role of the US in negotiations. Third, direct negotiations with the clerical regime in Iran will imply US recognition of their government. The US government will not take a position that may appear to legitimize the authority of the leading state sponsor of terrorism and a serial violator of its own citizens? human rights.
For the proponents of direct negotiations, the Iran-US relationship is not a tangential issue. The Iranian government ultimately fears a military confrontation with the US; thus, US officials must be at the table if security issues are to be addressed effectively. As former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski has observed, the current US policy of ?negotiating with the negotiators [E-3]? is absurd (source). Tehran is unlikely to ever negotiate in complete sincerity or reveal their true bottom line if agreements reached with the E-3 may or may not meet the subsequent approval of the US. Furthermore, proponents refute the concern that direct talks will legitimize the Iranian government. In fact, the international community and Iranian citizenry already recognize the authority of the clerical regime. Moreover, US officials have previously engaged in direct talks with their Iranian counterparts regarding Afghanistan and have participating in 6-party talks with the government of North Korea .
If the US government?s supposition is correct, and Iran is intent on developing a nuclear weapon, UN sanctions?if not military strikes?will be a required response. In either scenario, the US position is strengthened if it has previously demonstrated a full commitment to the negotiations process, ie direct talks with Iran. Such a demonstration will be necessary to convince Russia and China that diplomacy has been exhausted and that sanctions are necessary. Likewise, the vital support of the international community in the chaotic aftermath of a military strike against Iranian nuclear installations will only be forthcoming if all diplomatic options had been pursued.
