The recently released reports on the July 7, 2005 London subway bombings by a parliamentary committee and the UK Home Office add fascinating nuance to the conventional picture of the form and activities of the cell. In an update to the April 12 WAR Report and echoing the July 20, 2005 WAR Report, the new reports suggest that the cell was largely an autonomous and entrepreneurial homegrown cell?a ?vanguard outpost? cell (for further discussion of this concept see the January 4, 2006 WAR Report)?and that bombers Mohammed Sidique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer likely had contact with al Qaeda figures in Pakistan and possibly had operational training in Pakistan and/or Afghanistan . However, there remains no evidence to suggest that the cell received direct al-Qaeda operational planning or assistance.
The report says that planning likely began after Khan and Tanweer return to the UK from Pakistan, suggesting a certain invigoration of the would-be bombers? Islamist militancy in Pakistan, possibly by al-Qaeda figures. Further, in conjunction with the hypothesized militant training, the bombers may have had access to al-Qaeda advisors, providing further inspiration, sanctification, and/or operational counsel for the attacks short of directly planning the operations.
The aforementioned findings echo and revise early reports of a potential liaison with al-Qaeda elements in Pakistan and the attendant July 20, 2005 WAR Report, which assessed that:
?while the cell was composed of indigenous operatives and the plot may have been developed by the cell, the investigation?s course and insights would seem to indicate that an al-Qaeda connection is likely to exist, through:
? strategic and/or ideological inspiration for terrorist activities in Britain or Pakistan,
? the sanctioning of entrepreneurial attack plots by al-Qaeda representatives in Britain or Pakistan,
? possible training in Pakistan,
? possible operational assistance from Pakistan-based terrorist groups, and
? possible involvement of an al-Qaeda liaison-leader.
The exact nature and level of al-Qaeda core involvement in the attack plot?s creation and execution by the Leeds-London cell, if any, remains unclear, but recent developments in the investigation suggest a greater strategic and operational nexus with al-Qaeda elements as compared to an autonomous ?vanguard outpost? cell.
Further, the reports underscore that British security services failed to recognize the pace and threat of homegrown jihadists. The investigation into the London bombings, coupled with that of the Madrid bombings (see this WAR Report), and the recent unrest among immigrant and Muslim communities in France should serve to highlight arguably the greatest threat to Europe: the feelings among immigrant and Muslim communities in Europe of grievance, alienation, and social inequality vis-?-vis the government and wider ?indigenous? society. As discussed in these pages, this tense and seething societal milieu provides fertile ground for Islamist militancy to take root, offering an ideology and life course that promises sacrosanct avenues of empowerment, revenge, and redemption via Islamist militancy. It is from this milieu that the London vanguard outpost cell emerged and, if these societal dynamics are not addressed and ameliorated by greater societal integration and equality, may serve as the breeding ground for the next bombing of a capital city, this time possibly Paris, Copenhagen, or Rome.
