On May 15, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced the resumption of full diplomatic ties between the United States and Libya . The renewal of relations was facilitated by Libya?s decision to eliminate a fledgling weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program, renounce its support of terrorist groups, and make payments to the families of the victims of Pan-Am flight 103 , a terrorist operation supported by the Qaddafi regime. Rice?s comments cast the breakthrough as an example to Iran (see this WAR Report) and North Korea , characterizing Libya as a model to them both.
There are benefits and also controversies to reestablishing relations with Libya. The implication of Rice?s remarks, however, is that this decision may have been motivated not only by the particulars of Libyan-American dynamics, but by a desire to make an example out of Libya to Iran and North Korea. This is a futile exercise. Rogues, after all, are defined by their lack of concern with following the example of others in the mainstream. Iran and North Korea have constructed their own national myths and identities in the international system and how they hope to develop. It is not likely that Libya is held up as a model in either of these national narratives.
The dynamics surrounding the extraordinarily complex cases of Iran and North Korea little resemble the Libyan case. Rice?s comments imply that Libya sacrificed its WMD program, which comprised of very little, for the enviable ?carrot? of full diplomatic relations with the US. In reality, the ?sacrifice? of its paltry nuclear program was made in exchange for access to global energy markets. Libya came up with the bargaining chip of a WMD program to be proffered in exchange for the ability to sell Libyan oil on an international market on which oil prices were set to soar. This move quickly led to billions in increased profits. In 2003, Libyan oil export revenues were less than US$9 billion (estimated). Following the lifting of US and UN sanctions, oil export revenues for 2006 are estimated to come in at over US$31 billion. In exchange, Libya ?sacrificed? a so-called nuclear program that was not even close to producing a nuclear weapon and other non-conventional weapons programs of questionable use.
That combination of a very strong incentive to cooperate with little sacrifice required does not exist for Iran or North Korea. North Korea already has a nuclear weapon, which alone is responsible for its international significance as well as its protection from other nations. Iran fears US military action and may want to develop a weapon in order to protect itself from this threat. In this way, Iran probably looks at North Korea with its enviable negotiating position and relative security from foreign attack as its model, not Libya.
Also, unlike Libya, Iran has maintained its ability to sell its natural gas and petroleum resources to international energy markets. The fear of US invasion and the desire to play a more powerful role in the Middle East trump the limited potential economic benefit of abandoning its alleged nuclear program.
Strong economic incentives that influenced Libya?s decision may be present for impoverished North Korea. The country is desperate for humanitarian aid in the short-term and complete economic reconstruction over the long-term, and it may be able to exchange its nuclear program for such help. However, for those incentives to be effective, it would have to have a leadership that cared about the lives of its citizens and the economic viability of the country, concerns that do not seem to plague Kim Jong Il.
Though unlikely to have reverberations in Tehran and Pyong Yang, this development is a positive one for Libya and the US. For Libya, it represents the final obstacle toward ?repatriation? as a productive member of the international community and the access to foreign markets and foreign investment that this represents. Normalization is unlikely to have a considerable effect on international terrorism, however, although it may provide new intelligence sharing opportunities regarding North African terrorist entities.
For the US, repairing relations with Libya has a larger impact on oil security than it does on national security. Libya possesses the largest oil reserves in Africa, and Libyan oil is already coming to the US. On the very same day in April 2004 that the White House announced the lifting of US sanctions on Libya, Libya announced that its first shipment of oil in over 20 years was soon to be on its way to the US. US oil companies are already profiting . Multiple US corporations watched their claims to Libyan oil fields languish for more than two decades after the sanctions were passed, but now they are back in Libya. The US-based firm Occidental has seen earnings rise four percent ?due to revived Libyan oil production,? according to AMEinfo, an economic and business news organization focused on the Middle East. AMEinfo also reports that Marathon and ConocoPhilips have seen similar benefits. The incentives on both sides for mutual economic and business benefits may have helped push forward US-Libyan reconciliation.
The way toward healthy political relations may have been forged in the first place by productive business relations between the two countries that preceded the signs of diplomatic progress. In the 1980s, Libya embarked on an enormous development project called the Great Manmade River. The US$30 billion project is a massive effort to bring water from the south of the country to the northern coast for agriculture and human consumption. In spite of sanctions, US companies were involved. Halliburton, through a foreign office of its subsidiary Brown & Root, ?prepared the feasibility studies and drafted the specifications? for the Great Manmade River, according to New York Times reporting in 1997 (source). As of 1997, Halliburton was also the project manager, according to the New York Times, but would not reveal the financials of the contract. Other US companies, including a pipe manufacturing company in Ohio, were also said to be involved in building the Great Manmade River (source).
In the Arab press, the decision to normalize relations has been criticized by some because the agreement was made ?without any conditions related to the government?s [improvement] of human rights,? as stated in the influential London-based pan-Arab paper al-Quds al-Arabi. The article in al-Quds al-Arabi criticized the US for both abandoning the Libyan opposition that it claims the US once supported and for rewarding Qaddafi in spite of the lack of ?political and democratic reforms and freedom of expression? in Libya. ?The United States exploits the issue of human rights and freedoms to pressure regimes that disagree with their policies and [obstruct] their interests. But when it gets what it wants and the pressure starts to bear fruit, it abandons its initial claims on this issue.? Al-Quds al-Arabi tends toward an anti-American line, however, and a number of other Arab press reports on this issue were not negative.
