Recent weeks have seen powerful insurgent and sectarian dynamics in Iraq that have combined to draw Iraq closer to civil war. The continuing violence and menace of sectarian militias; the upsurge in apparent targeted sectarian killings; the purported strategy of al Qaeda in Iraq to incite civil war through attacks on the Shia community; and the reported high number of Iraqis fleeing sectarian violence all serve as indicators of this trajectory toward civil war.
The recently released al Qaeda in Iraq strategy documents seized by the US military (see above) provides fascinating insight into certain strategic and tactical aspects of the jihadist insurgency. The documents reveals among the jihadists an apparent concern for their relationship with the Sunni community as allies in the insurgency, and seem to be disturbed by the movement of Sunnis toward greater political moderation and involvement. Further, the documents suggest avoiding overt conflict with the Sunnis. Such concerns on the part of jihadists underscore the advantages of the ongoing counterinsurgency strategy aimed at enticing Sunni insurgents and their supportive communities away from potential alliance with the jihadist groups via political engagement and avenues of political empowerment. This strategy seeks to sap the insurgency of its majority ranks, and isolate the jihadists from important operational and political support of the Sunni insurgents and community.
Another important strategic contour revealed in the document is an apparent strategy of inciting a civil war in Iraq by seeking to exacerbate roiling sectarian tensions via attacks against the Shia community, likely with the hopes of provoking an overreaction by Shia militias against the Sunnis, thus setting in motion sectarian conflict. The jihadists likely seek to exploit ensuing chaos and instability of civil war to expand their operations and power, as well as potentially drive the Sunnis, menaced by the majority Shia, more squarely behind the insurgency. The document specifically calls for attacks against the Shia community and its displacement and expulsion from jihadist areas (likely Sunni areas)?a strategy paralleling, and possibly catalyzing, the increasing levels of internal migration of Iraqis fleeing sectarian conflict and intimidation at the hands of sectarian militias and conflict.
On topic of internal refugee flows, James Reynolds of the BBC has reported that the Iraqi Red Crescent claims that almost 100,000 people?both Shias and Sunnis?have fled sectarian violence, with indications of a designed campaign of intimidation and expulsion. The Associated Press (AP) has reported that Iraq?s Vice President Adil Abdul-Mahdi claims sectarian violence had forced 100,000 Iraqis to flee, 90 per cent of them Shias. The AP also reported that Dr. Saleh Abdul-Razzaq, spokesman for the government body that operates Shia religious institutions, contends that 13,750 Iraqi families?roughly 90,000 people?have been displaced by sectarian violence, including 25,000 Iraqis who fled following the February 22nd Samarra shrine bombing . In addition, the AP also reported that a Sunni clerical group, the Association of Muslim Scholars, said that 980 Sunni families have been displaced, numbering roughly 5,000 people, in fleeing Baghdad?s sectarian violence. Richard Oppel of the New York Times reported that Iraqi national security adviser, Mowaffak al-Rubaie said, ?13,750 families had been displaced, which could mean about 70,000 to 80,000 people.?
Even the more conservative estimates of internal refugees are a source of major concern in serving as momentum toward more widespread and designed campaigns of ethnic-religious cleansing and civil war. Dr. Said Hakki, the president of the Iraqi Red Crescent, is quoted by Reynolds as saying that, ?The problem is big and it?s growing exponentially.? Hakki went on to say that “The Iraqi Red Crescent feels that this is an organised issue. Somebody is behind this who is highly organised.”
Evidence supporting the indicators of an increasing trend of targeted sectarian violence are figures from a recent Los Angeles Times article which reported that, ?More Iraqi civilians were killed in Baghdad during the first three months of this year than at any time since the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime ? at least 3,800, many of them found hogtied and shot execution-style. Others were strangled, electrocuted, stabbed, garroted or hanged. Some died in bombings. Many bore signs of torture such as bruises, drill holes, burn marks, gouged eyes or severed limbs.?
That there are such indicators of a marked spike in targeted sectarian killings, and designed campaigns of ethnic-religious sectarian forced expulsions and cleansing should be a source of profound concern. Those individuals potentially behind these campaigns and incitement of sectarian conflict could include jihadists carrying out the aforementioned strategy of sectarian provocation, or the more violent and vigilante sectarian militias. Once such cleansing begins, and the virulent climate of sectarian identities, fear, conflict, and violent retribution take hold, the violence will create its own cascading and spiraling momentum, which is extremely difficult to arrest, promises to quickly plunge Iraq into ethnic-religious civil war. With the aforementioned numbers of Iraqis fleeing sectarian violence, the country is quickly approaching this precipice of all out civil war?a crossing of which would create a de facto partitioning of the country into entrenched rival ethnic-religious provinces in conflict.
