Dishearteningly, just as some good news finally emerges from Darfur, headlines of regional militant factionalization, alliances, and attacks coupled with UN warnings of regional destabilization severely tempers any budding optimism for the millions of refugees in Sudan , Chad , and Central African Republic .
On May 5, 2006, a majority of the Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLM) (Minni Minnawi faction) accepted the peace agreement proffered by the international community and supported by the Sudanese government. The Abdel Wahid Nur faction of the SLM initially balked at the framework, as did the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and rebel group the National Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD) , but the Nur faction is publicly reconsidering its decision under intense diplomatic pressure. The central tenants of the agreement include:
? Cease-fire,
? Disarmament of government militias such as the Janjaweed ,
? Integration of militants into Sudan’s armed forces, and
? Protection forces for civilians
Although all the rebel groups have violated various previous cease-fires, it seems that it will be most difficult to ensure the participation of the Janjaweed since they are essentially immune from international pressure, and, although they receive support from the Sudanese government and military, it retains a significant degree of autonomy and is not easily influenced by officials of President Omar Hassan al-Bashir.
Khartoum does, however, appear to have deep ties and a strong influence over a growing alliance of rebels in neighboring Chad. On April 13, 2006, dozens of trucks carrying over 1,000 militants arrived at the outskirts of N’Djamena, having traveled 620 miles from the Sudan-Chad border . According to press reports, the UN Security Council received a briefing that some 1,200 rebels wearing new uniforms made the journey in three days in nearly 125 new vehicles. Along the route, villages were raided and destroyed, but the assault on the capital was quickly repelled the same day with security forces capturing nearly 250 armed attackers. Although the leadership elements of the attacking force was quickly acknowledged to be members of the United Front for Change (FUC) based in Chad, the logistical support and forced recruitment and deployment of attackers (some as young as 12) in possession of Sudanese and Central African Republican identification as well as known Chadian rebel groups highlights the internationalization of this seemingly domestic civil war.
The realization of the wide yet tangled web of supporters of the failed Chad coup prompted UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to warn that militant groups are spilling across borders across central Africa, threatening to undermine the peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts across the continent. Annan cautioned that, “If you have another escalation in Chad you risk destabilizing the whole region, not just Chad but also the Central African Republic, a sort of domino effect that we have seen in the Great Lakes region.” For example, as civilians feared a second coup attack leading up to the Chadian elections held on May 3, 2006, thousands fled across the border seeking refuge in Cameroon.
The proliferation of foreign and international troop deployments further complicate the situation on the ground. France added another 150 soldiers to its deployment of 1,200 in Chad shortly after the coup attempt to shore up its protective details of French interests in its former colony. Although Khartoum has been implicated in supporting the recent FUC coup attack, Chadian President Idriss Deby is known to have supported elements of the Darfur rebels with whom he holds tribal ties. Additionally, as some international aid groups are withdrawing from dangerous regions in Darfur and Chad, others are asking and receiving protection from international forces from the African Union and elsewhere. As more armed peacekeepers are introduced into the mix as a result of Sudan’s peace agreement, it is becoming increasingly difficult for anyone to tell which armed groups are performing assistance. In sum, it appears that Kofi Annan’s warning has already come true: just as Darfur stands poised to finalize a significant ceasefire and possibly a legitimate peace agreement, various militant groups straddling international frontiers supported in part by opposing foreign governments remain engaged in arming and destabilizing their neighbors, thereby continuing the misery of the estimated two million refugees across central Africa.
