Despite facing down a coup attempt in late February 2006 , President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s security forces have made remarkable headway countering three of the Philippines most dangerous terrorist groups: Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) Jemaah Islamiya (JI) , and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) . Yet, although some key operational leaders have been identified, recently tracked and some even captured, a critical few remain at large. Additionally, reports suggest that strategic funding of ASG and JI is suspected to be running low prompting some to speculate that a smaller scale wave of criminal activity is imminent that might even rise to the level of the spectacular ransom kidnappings ASG popularized in 2000 and 2001
The news article above is filled with several counterterrorism operational details not often found in the media of other countries. The Philippine press has not just alluded to possible cooperation between ASG and JI, but actually provides names and estimated numbers within cells. Romeo Ricardo, acting head of Philippines national police intelligence is on record estimating ASG’s current strength at about 400 under the leadership of Khaddafy Janjalani, while JI is believed to have deployed as many as 40 operatives across the southern Muslim-majority Philippine Islands including cell leaders Dulmatin (aka Pitono) and Umar Patek – both currently sought for their roles in the 2002 Bali bombing . In early April, Philippine forces engaged an ASG cell resulting in the death of Amilhamja Ajijul responsible for a number of bombings across in Zamboanga including the 2002 killing of a US serviceman and two Filipinos . On April 25, a military spokesman reported that troops apprehended ASG operative Abu Omar (aka Sharie Amiruddin) in Zamboanga City on Mindanao. Importantly, Philippine authorities have had success disrupting a cell on a raid in Marikina City on April 27, 2006. Within a week of that strike, authorities reported a 30-strong ASG cell led Janjalani and another cell of 15 JI militants said to include Dulmatin and Patek had been driven out Liguasan marsh.
A significant feature of success in the Liguasan marsh is that it lies in MILF-controlled territory along the Pulangi River in central Mindanao and thus appears to be a fortunate consequence of continued dialogue with the militant leadership in Kuala Lumpur which is anticipated to result in a signed peace agreement later this year. Although the final delineation of the “ancestral home” has not yet resolved, observers expect the gap to be bridged in time for a declaration and signing ceremony by September 2006. It seems likely then, that as MILF gains significant stakes in the peace process, they are less apt to support overtly (or even covertly) the radical MILF-breakaway faction – Abu Sayyaf Group.
Despite the negotiating success with MILF and harassment, pursuit, apprehension and death of other key militants, the leadership remains alive and free even if the cells are fractured. Evidence at all reported raids and skirmishes confirm explosives are being collected, saved in caches, and plotting continues on bombing-extortion schemes, other criminal activities, and even political bombing campaigns. On April 27, 2006, Inspector Ricardo warned about current “active threats” – especially bombing threats to shopping malls, public parks, and prominent western targets in key municipalities such as General Santos City, Davao, Cagayan de Oro, and Zamboanga. Additionally, while local authorities were suggesting militants are scrounging for funds, a U.N. Security Council counter-terrorism panel warned on April 20, 2006 about the high volume of monies still flowing through non-traditional channels to religious, charitable and relief organizations with ties to militant groups. Panel spokeswoman Ellen Margarethe Loj decried that nearly half of the 10-member Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) have not yet ratified the international convention concerning the financing of terrorism. As such, while the recent Philippine successes must be noted, encouraged, and supported, significant counterterrorism measures are still needed and continued smaller scale bombings can be expected at public commercial targets and western business and travel interests.
