The recent comments from Iraqi President Jalal Talabani that he believes that at least seven Sunni nationalist-political groups can be enticed into abandoning the insurgency in return for political avenues of empowerment is encouraging in terms of counterinsurgency efforts.
As the insurgency in Iraq is overwhelmingly comprised of indigenous Sunnis motivated by a cocktail of largely nationalist-political goals with some Islamist undertones and is lead by former senior military and intelligence operatives from the Hussein regime, efforts to entice them away from insurgent activities are critical. The disposition of Sunni insurgents and their base of societal support between participation in the political process and insurgent violence is a key driver of the strength, vigor, and durability of national political stability.
An advantageous counterinsurgency approach (though one that would benefit from more widespread application) is aimed at crafting differentiated strategies tailored to engage and combat the particular motivations, societal support, and operational capabilities of the two primary camps within the insurgency: the Sunni nationalist-political insurgents and the foreign jihadists. Reports have indicated a growing division and open armed conflict between these camps due to dissonance in the camps? particular strategic goals and attendant tactics and targeting. Iraqi insurgents have become angered with the jihadists? penchant for employing indiscriminant attacks that target or kill the very population that the Iraqi insurgents perceive as their constituency and whom they seek to defend and empower. Further, the jihadists seem bent on disrupting the national political process, an arena that Iraqi Sunni insurgents have come to view as an avenue for empowerment and achieving their political goals. On this topic, the London Telegraph reported in April that a prominent Sunni tribal leader, Sheikh Osama Jadaan, from Anbar province has declared war on jihadis in his area and claims to have arrested and killed 300 entering from Syria .
Various reports throughout the past two years (many discussed in these pages, including the January 11 WAR Report, and the April 12 WAR Report) have indicated an apparent vacillation by Sunni insurgents and their base of support between insurgent activities and pursuits of communal and political empowerment via political negotiations and participation in the political processes. Over past months, the Sunni community and insurgents seemed to be reorienting their posture toward political participation and potential moderation or cessation of violence by some elements in return for political power, in some cases turning against the jihadists. However, as a result of recent sectarian violence targeting the Sunni community?widely perceived by Sunnis to be perpetrated by Shia militias acting at the behest, or with the tacit endorsement of, the Shia-dominated government?and wider faltering political prospects, the potential remains that Sunnis may become disillusioned with the prospects for communal and political empowerment. In turn, these Sunni insurgent elements may have their views reconfirmed that classic insurgent activities against the government represents the most advantageous?or only?avenues of defending and pursuing the interests of the Sunni community vis-?-vis a Shia-dominated national government, security forces, and sectarian militias perceived as menacing the Sunni community. A full return of the Sunni community and insurgents to violence would invigorate and strengthen the insurgency.
Thus, it remains critical for counterinsurgency efforts that there be an invigoration of the Iraqi government and US strategy of enticing Sunnis to demobilize for political power, drawing them away from operational collaboration with foreign fighters, sapping the insurgency of its core ranks and societal support, and isolating foreign fighters who can be engaged by military counterterrorism operations.
A number of such negotiations and near-deals between Sunni insurgents and the Iraqi government have been reported in months past, and progress and success on these fronts has been difficult to discern. However, within the context of an assessed general reorientation of segments of the Sunni insurgent milieu toward political negotiation and participation over recent months, Talabani?s assessment would suggest promising traction.
