The prospects for sustained peace in southern Sudan have never been brighter, but significant challenges to the implementation of the peace accord signed 16 months ago remain. Factional fighting within the South Sudan Defense Forces (SSDF) former-rebel alliance is one of those challenges. A lingering dispute over which territories comprise the south leaves important questions regarding distribution of proceeds from natural resources unanswered. Instability in Khartoum and neighboring countries is prompting the early return of thousands?if not millions?of southern Sudan refugees to their homeland, which is hardly prepared for such an influx. Finally, Osama bin Laden’s most recent taped message (see this WAR Report) calling for, inter alia, the mobilization of a mujahedeen to Sudan threatens to add a wave of heavily-armed militants to the equation. One common thread among these factors is a scarcity of resources. Only by reducing the general scarcity will the mission of peace have a viable chance of success.
The first hint that the SSDF alliance was fractured became apparent in January 2006 when commander Paulino Matip (see photo left) initialed an agreement, pledging to merge the SSDF into the SPLM’s south Sudan army. Upon the news, a rival faction emerged led by Gordon Kong (see photo in following column) that opposed the union. It is not yet clear whether the fissure is due to political ethno-nationalist concerns or perhaps more basic resource and economic issues. The SPLM is dominated by the powerful minority Dinka community led by rebel commander John Garang (see photo right) until his death in mid-2005. Some analysts suggest Kong’s opposition stems from tribal disputes over land, cattle, and water, while Matip claims “Gordon Kong has no troops with him. He is in Khartoum and the northern military intelligence is giving him arms and people to protect him.” Regardless of whether the Khartoum regime is supporting Kong, until the militias can be folded peaceably into legitimate armed forces and until rival factions can be disarmed, a return to bloodshed remains likely.
Contributing to the instability is a rapid influx of returning refugees to the resource-strapped south. Tens of thousands are returning from Khartoum where, although as Christians and Animists they did not support the Arab Muslim-dominant government, they did enjoy comparative stability. Additionally, local and international observers and aid workers are scrambling to coordinate a massive influx of, by one estimate, up to six million refugees from neighboring countries. Khartoum’s state Interior Minister Brigadier Aleu Avieny Aleu expects the imminent return of as many as 200,000 Sudanese refugees from Uganda , prompted by the prospects for peace and stability and by the fear of Uganda’s Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) rebels who have long used southern Sudanese hideouts for sanctuary. In the meantime, the UN and international aid organizations have been attempting to repatriate south Sudanese from the Central African Republic that began in February 2006 followed by an influx of returning refugees from the Democratic Republic of Congo in late March 2006. Other populations returning from Ethiopia are expected to begin their journeys in April 2006.
The most recent ingredient added to this simmering stew of a proliferation of armed groups and exploding refugee populations is the call by al-Qaeda’s bin Laden to rally a jihad to the western Darfur region of Sudan in support of the Islamic regime and to oppose the expansion of western influence across his exile home in the mid-1990s. While bin Laden’s appeal may appear far-fetched, it underscores the religious fault lines that fueled Sudan’s civil war in the south.
President Omar al-Bashir’s overseas appeals won pan-Arab support across the Muslim world, ultimately prompting Western governments and Israel to provide assistance to the SPLM/Army . Bin Laden’s rhetoric could feasibly rekindle the dying embers of religious conflict in the south and fuel yet another round of violence that has lasted over 20 years and resulted in the deaths of some two million Sudanese. Yet, perhaps as a sign of bin Laden’s diminishing influence, on April 24, 2006, Sudan’s Foreign Ministry Spokesman Jamal Mohammed Ibrahim stated, “Sudan has nothing to do with such statements. We are not concerned with any mujahideen or any crusade or any war with the international community. We are keen on reaching a peaceful solution to the crisis in Darfur.” If such a claim can be taken at face value, then perhaps President Bashir may have already poured cold water on one of the remaining embers of Sudan’s multifaceted, two-decade civil war.
