Solidifying his role as Latin America’s power broker, Hugo Chavez is seeking to further militarize Venezuela’s populace by training one million Venezuelans to form a quasi-army reserve unit. The reserve units will act as an on-call force, ready and able to assist Venezuela’s active military with guerrilla-type attacks against US “invaders.” Some 150,000 Venezuelans have answered the call to arms and have undergone or will undergo weekend training exercises in which they will acquire proficiency in weaponry and partake in physical training regiments. A large majority of volunteers are residents from the massive Venezuelan slum populations from where Chavez draws his fiercest support. The mobilization has the potential to pose several national, regional, and international problems and could alter the future geo-political outlook within the region drastically.
Designed explicitly to address real or imagined invasion threats from the US, Chavez increasingly has invoked rhetoric and images of a bygone era. Calling for a “war of resistance” and “resistance from the hills,” Chavez’s words are eerily reminiscent of leftist governments and guerrilla groups of the Cold War and demonstrate the Venezuelan government’s desire to export the revolution throughout Latin America. Reminiscent of the Japanese self defense forces created prior to the US-planned invasion of Japan during World War II, Chavez’s public militias could ensure an aggressive stance against perceived invading US forces.
This unprecedented mobilization could alter dramatically the present supremacy of Colombia in Latin America, further straining ties between the two governments. Additionally, the Colombian, government is concerned that Venezuelan weapon caches could be used to arm the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia , as Chavez remains a quiet supporter of the leftist guerrilla group. Regional tensions could be further alienated if leftist political leader Ollanta Humala is victorious in the May 7 Peruvian presidential run-off election . Humala has received overwhelming support from Chavez and will undoubtedly receive substantial foreign aid and investment from fellow populist-nationalist leaders. Humala’s victory would ensnare Colombia between two ideologically incompatible states, likely fostering frustration and animosity between the three states.
Critics of Chavez maintain that the civilian defense forces are designed to maintain his hold on power and to isolate and suppress outspoken political critics. However, the mobilization may also symbolize Chavez’s lasting distrust of the Venezuelan military establishment that was largely responsible for his 2002 attempted ouster. By uniting his base of support?namely, the impoverished Venezuelan community?Chavez is creating a counterbalance to any threat that exists from the Venezuelan military leadership, although such threats largely have been purged since the 2002 coup attempt.
However, general mobilization may produce fatal implications for Chavez if he loses the support of the lower classes. Although such a potentiality appears unlikely due to the windfall profits Venezuela’s petroleum industry continues to generate and the enormous social welfare system such profits allow for, a sudden decrease in petroleum sector profit revenue could reduce Chavez’s stature among his base dramatically. Venezuela’s continued dependence on petroleum and the rapid price fluctuations that accompany turbulent oil markets leaves the Venezuelan economy in a constant state of unease. Lack of diversification in the Venezuelan economy, particularly Venezuela’s industrial sector, limits alternative sources of revenue if world oil prices unexpectedly fall. Such an outcome would represent a severe blow to the financial stability of the economy and the social welfare programs Chavez’s government depends upon to maintain loyalty among the impoverished Venezuelan community.
