Much hyperbole and bombast surrounds Iran?s claims of successful uranium enrichment. On the one hand, the Iranian government has an interest in promoting its ability to enrich uranium in an attempt to present the international community with a fait accompli. On the other hand, elements in the international community also appear to be interested in hyping Iran?s enrichment as a means of provoking a confrontation with the Iranian government. Fortunately, much of this rhetoric does not appear to be based on the available evidence.
Even if one accepts Iran?s claims that it enriched uranium to 3.5% through the use of a 164-centrifuge cascade as the truth, it must be recognized that Iran still has many more hurdles to overcome before weaponization can be achieved. According to publicly available sources, Iran still faces a number of hurdles in its quest to master the entire nuclear fuel cycle. Principal among those hurdles are Iran?s ability to assemble the materials required to produce its stated goal of 54,000 centrifuges. According to international security expert David Albright, Iran has enough parts for approximately 1,000 to 2,000 centrifuges. While a fully tested and operational 2,000 centrifuge cascade has the potential for producing 50kg of uranium enriched to 90% in approximately 18-24 months, intelligence officials and security experts do not believe that Iran has expertise to either operate a centrifuge construction production line or the expertise to operate a fully operational centrifuge cascade. As a result, it is widely believed that Iran will need additional time to perfect a centrifuge production line as well as a fully operational cascade.
While the presence of these hurdles suggests that Iran is not on the cusp of developing a nuclear weapon, there are a number of unanswered questions that could further alter the estimate of when Iran might have a nuclear weapons capability. For example, the IAEA and the international community are not sure if Iran is secretly developing a more advanced centrifuge, known as the P-2, based on the black market designs of AQ Khan (WAR Report and 2006 Projections). If the Iranians successfully developed and mass produced the P-2, they would shorten the time required to enrich uranium, as the P-2 centrifuges can more effectively and efficiently enrich uranium. In addition, the P-2 is a more sturdy design and will likely suffer a lower failure rate than the early generations of P-1 centrifuges that Iran is thought to have used in its recent 164 test cascade.
Another uncertainty regarding Iran?s enrichment progress is the design of its cascade of centrifuges. If Iran has mastered the process of building a cascade of centrifuges connected in serial, it will be able to reduce the time required to enrich uranium to weapons grade levels. However, connecting centrifuges in serial is more complex and difficult to master than connecting centrifuges in parallel. A parallel connection will increase the time required to enrich uranium to weapons grade levels. As a result, it is vitally important to understand the complexity of Iran?s cascade design in order to develop a more complete understanding of when Iran might be able to achieve weapons grade enrichment.
As a result, it is unclear when Iran will achieve the ability to develop nuclear weapons. However, given the hurdles in its path, there does not appear to be a compelling reason to alter the US government?s current estimates of when Iran can build a nuclear weapon.
