The leaked findings of the investigation into the London bombings ?notably that the bombing cell reportedly had no direct operational ties to al-Qaeda , that the operation was inexpensive to mount, and that the cell utilized the Internet to plan the operation?echo similar findings on the Madrid train bombing cell that has come to light from that investigation and analyzed in the WAR Report. The findings support TRC analyses of the likely perpetrators of the London bombings published shortly after the attacks .
Of particular note are the findings that the bombing cell was homegrown and had no direct operational support from the al-Qaeda organization, noting that the investigation has uncovered no evidence to suggest that an al-Qaeda handler organized and led the cell, but rather that the cell seemed to have been, as described by Reuters, ??partly inspired by ringleader Mohammad Sidique Khan’s trips to Pakistan.? In addition, the cell was reportedly motivated to conduct the attacks in response to its perception of Britain?s foreign policy as definitively anti-Muslim, coupled with the cell members? desire for martyrdom.
The investigation has also found that, similar to the Madrid cell, the London cell utilized the Internet to plan and as a resource for engineering their bombs. This fact, in both contexts, underscores the critical importance of cyberspace as not only a medium for the dissemination of strategic guidance, inspiration, and dialogue for Islamist and jihadist militants, but also a resource for the proliferation of terrorist tradecraft and weapons engineering.
The investigations of both the Madrid and London train bombings have, thus far, painted remarkably similar pictures of the structure, motivations, modus operandi, and entrepreneurialism of the two cells and strongly support past TRC analyses, which, as the March 15, 2006 WAR Report describes, assess that al-Qaeda is:
?evolving into a globally diffuse, jihadist movement comprised of atomized, operationally amoebic, and adaptive constellations of al-Qaeda-inspired and affiliated cells, groups, and networks that are guided in strategic terms by al-Qaeda leadership communiqu?s. At the leading edge of this expansion seems to be what can be ?vanguard outpost? cells that have little to no operational connection to al-Qaeda but are rallied by al-Qaeda ideology and strategic guidance communiqu?s to conduct autonomous and entrepreneurial operations in the service of al-Qaeda?s professed general strategic goals and against targets identified by the al-Qaeda leadership?
As the two bombing investigations reveal, this evolution of al-Qaeda and the proliferation of jihadist ?vanguard outpost? groups within Western countries would seem to be building. That these cells emerge from within the society of the targeted nation, possibly with ?clean? records and under the radar of security services, and that they plan their operations with relatively simple and subtle operational transactions that are often difficult to identify amid wider societal activities, draws to the fore what is likely to be a continued and major terrorist threat from ?vanguard outpost? cells.
