A couple of weeks ago, Huthaifa Azzam, son of al-Qaeda founder and former Osama Bin Laden spiritual mentor Abdullah Azzam , discovered a hand-delivered threat from terrorist leader Abu Musaab al-Zarqawi slipped under the door of his home in Amman, Jordan . In the form of an audio message recorded to a CD, the threat was directed personally at Azzam by the Jordanian terrorist. CNN reported on the threat, quoting Azzam as saying ?He was very angry. He was telling me??You have changed your way. Now you are serving the policy of the enemy?? (source).
Months before, Azzam had publicly criticized Zarqawi for carrying out the Amman hotel bombings , in addition to condemning roundly terrorist attacks that targeted Jordan, Egypt , and Saudi Arabia . Though he defended the legitimacy of the resistance in Iraq , and by his own account had helped to jumpstart the insurgency, he made it clear that his opinion and that of his father?s was that Jihad was for fighting in Muslim countries occupied by outside powers only. Many embraced Azzam?s comments as a sign of his moderation, ignoring the fact that he still endorsed terror in the Iraqi theater. Apparently, Zarqawi also saw Azzam?s comments as a sort of softening and took offense enough to record the CD later delivered to Azzam?s doorstep.
Now, Azzam is making the rounds in the media, talking first to the satellite television news station Al-Arabiya and also to the Jordanian paper Al-Zaman, the Agence France Presse, and then on April 4 writing a letter to the London-based Al-Quds Al-Arabi. Azzam is spreading the word that Zarqawi has been demoted, that he has ceded political control of the insurgency to an Iraqi named Abdullah Rashad al-Baghdadi. He is being cut out of all political decision making, relegated to a purely military role.
Azzam claims that he has very close ties to the Iraqi insurgency. Speaking to freelance journalist Nir Rosen last month, Azzam claimed that he was among the first Jihadists to establish a base for the resistance in Fallujah, just days after the collapse of Baghdad (source). Azzam said he and a group of followers ?went from mosque to mosque? garnering support for a resistance to the US occupation. He spent four months in the country advising Iraqis on fighting a guerrilla war, drawing on his experience at terrorist training camps and fighting in Afghanistan and Bosnia . Even in the early days of the Iraqi insurgency, he said, he was opposed to Zarqawi and encouraged supporters not to give funds to Zarqawi?s organization.
Given the history between the two men, it is possible that Azzam?s recent reports on Zarqawi?s fallen status are a symptom of their rivalry. However, other indications seem to corroborate Zarqawi?s recently obscured status in the insurgency (“Iraqi Insurgents May Be Turning on Zarqawi,” Terror Web Watch). While Azzam may be motivated by personal issues to attempt to embarrass Zarqawi by revealing his reduced status, that does not necessarily mean what he is saying is untrue. Still, the history between the two men should be taken into account when evaluating his claims.
Azzam claims that Zarqawi was asked to abandon his ?political role? in the insurgency to an Iraqi by ?the high leadership of the resistance in Iraq?because of a number of errors he had committed.? Among these mistakes were ?the targeting of neighboring countries like Jordan,? which Azzam said resulted in a conflict between Zarqawi and other resistance leaders who felt that plots such as the Amman hotel bombings were ?neither logical nor Islamically legal.? Other mistakes included some of Zarqawi?s network?s kidnappings and beheadings. Zarqawi?s problem, Azzam says, is that he ?established his own private organization in Iraq, and then claimed to speak on behalf of the Iraqi people and the Iraqi resistance.? This angered other insurgent groups that believed that Zarqawi?s terrorism marred the reputation of the resistance.
Azzam claims that the change in power occurred about two weeks ago and that Zarqawi ceded his role voluntarily after lengthy negotiations within the resistance. Zarqawi, however, will still participate in military operations. ?He has been entirely relieved of all work in the political realm?but [the resistance] will still benefit from his military expertise.?
According to an Al-Quds Al-Arabi report describing a letter Azzam sent to the paper in which he discussed more details of Zarqawi?s fall, the real indication that Zarqawi had been reduced in status came during negotiations over a Jordanian hostage. Mahmoud Saidat, a driver for a Jordanian diplomat, was kidnapped by the followers of Zarqawi after the Amman attacks. His captors threatened to kill him unless the Jordanian government would free Sajida Rishawi, the female suicide bomber whose vest failed to detonate on November 9. The safe release of Saidat was ordered by someone in the insurgency, even though Rishawi remained firmly in Jordanian custody. This, according to the report, was the initial indication that there were powers greater than Zarqawi within the insurgency.
This report also revealed that the greatest driving motivation for demoting Zarqawi was the Amman attacks and the consequences that those attacks had on the Iraqi resistance. Azzam claims that before the attacks, the relationship between Iraqi insurgents and Jordan was a good one. After the attacks, he says, Iraqis in Jordan came under strict surveillance and the border between Iraq and Jordan was severely tightened. The inhibited mobility of Iraqis within Jordan and the damage to the relationship between the insurgents and the Jordanians prompted anger within the insurgent leadership. The desire to restore relations and the reputation of the resistance with neighboring countries is cited in this report as a primary motivation for Zarqawi?s dethroning.
Azzam implies that there will be no more attacks on neighboring countries by the Iraqi insurgency. He has also said there will be no more beheadings and implied there would be more discretion in kidnappings (although he defended the right of the insurgency to continue kidnapping journalists).
However, it is hard to know how much Azzam can claim to speak for the entire insurgency; after all, he is currently living comfortably in Jordan. Already, two insurgent groups have taken issue with one of his tangential comments in the press. After Azzam listed five insurgent groups that were still unified with Zarqawi?s network, sources in two of the groups, the 20th Revolution Brigades (Group Profile forthcoming) and the Islamic Army in Iraq refuted this, declaring in the Arabic press and in an Internet statement that they were not among those allied with Zarqawi. It could be an indication that Azzam is not completely in touch with the intra-insurgency politics.
As for Zarqawi, it is hard to imagine that he will take his diminished status easily or will allow himself to be boxed into the role of military advisor for the Iraqi insurgency. The ultimate target of his Jihad has never been Iraq or even the American forces that he attacks there. Rather, for Zarqawi, his ultimate enemy has been the Jordanian regime and the Israeli state that he believes it protects. He is internationally-focused, unlike the Iraqi resistance factions whose strategy is calibrated to Iraqi national politics. He may be waiting this period out and allowing himself to be distanced from this nationally-oriented Jihad. In so doing, he can be freed from the constraints that come with managing the political considerations and balancing the mesh of players and interests that come with a domestically-focused insurgency in a country that does not represent his endgame.
Azzam has said that resistance leaders put pressure on Zarqawi to promise not to attack Jordan again. Zarqawi?s stepping down could mean he would not agree to such a condition in order to retain power in Iraq. Zarqawi still enjoys more support outside of Iraq than any other terrorist leader besides Bin Laden and likely also has access to a number of social networks in several countries from connections gained throughout his life and Jihadist career. This change means that he could be spinning off, rather than stepping down, and having hit a ceiling in Iraq, he will likely turn his attention to other theaters.
Part II of this two part series will be in next week’s WAR Report.