When Nicholas Burns , US Under Secretary for Political Affairs, announced ?some Al Qaeda [Group Profile] members and those from like minded extremist groups continue to use Iran [Country Profile] as a safe haven and as a hub to facilitate their operations,? he highlighted a critical asset of Iranian Foreign Policy: a network of influence over multiple terrorist organizations and a patronage system that extends to any group capable of helping Tehran achieve its foreign policy goals. Given Iran?s strategic use of terrorism, it remains noteworthy that Tehran has suffered relatively few consequences?if any?for its actions, from either victimized countries or the international community.
Tehran maintains a significant influence over a spectrum of terrorist organizations by providing them with funds, logistical support, and training. By aiding terrorists, Tehran is able to indirectly attack and threaten conventionally stronger enemies (ie US and Israel ). Alternatively, the cessation of their support can cripple a terrorist organization. Therefore, in addition to using terrorism as an offensive weapon, Tehran?s ability to augment or diminish the capabilities of various terrorist groups is a powerful negotiating tactic. The current ?detention? of senior al-Qaeda operatives in Iran is an apt example, as Tehran has transformed them into chess pieces. They are allowed to communicate and plan operations occasionally yet are dangled as bait should the US government or international community ever meet the asking price (potentially leaders of the Iranian opposition group, MEK ).
Tehran?s patronage is not restricted by the religious principles of the Shiite theocracy. The dominant factor governing Iranian support for a terrorist organization is whether that group?s actions can further Iranian interests. Thus, in its desire to see Israel destroyed, the Iranian government has supported the Sunni group Hamas as well as Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade , the armed wing of the secular Fatah . Described in detail by the LA Times article, Tehran has also developed extensive ties with al-Qaeda?a radical Sunni organization closely affiliated with an Iranian enemy (Afghani Taliban), yet committed to harming ?The Great Satan,? the US. Likewise, in its effort to defeat the US mission in Iraq and the broader democracy campaign for the region, Tehran has reportedly provided safe haven and aid to Abu Musab al Zarqawi ? a terrorist who targets Shiites and describes them as a ?sect of betrayal and treachery? (source).
As the recognized leading state sponsor of terrorism, it is difficult to assess why the Iranian government has not suffered more serious consequences for its actions. Perhaps, it is because Iran?s specific links to terrorist organizations and attacks are nebulous; the government?s insistence on culpable deniability protects them from retribution. Or perhaps, it is because terrorism as a state weapon is a highly effective deterrent. Victimized states, or the states composing an international body, are hesitant in taking strong actions against Tehran because of the potential retaliation. Whatever the factors protecting Iran, a sovereign nation utilizing terrorism or the threat of terrorism as an armed complement to its foreign policy is a dangerous precedent, and one the global community can ill afford.
