A building confluence of synergistic factors and trends related to Taliban activity in the Afghanistan -Pakistan borderlands has raised the potential for the entrenchment of Taliban elements and an upsurge in their operations in the region this spring.
In addition to the reported infusion of weapons, materiel, and fighters into the Taliban cadres along the borderlands?covered in recent months in these pages (February 15, 2006 WAR Report and February 8, 2006 WAR Report)?the Washington Post report adds new evidence to support the January 25, 2006 WAR Report, which discussed the Taliban’s consolidation of control over some of the villages in the borderlands. The Taliban seems to be accomplishing this via a combination of intimidation of the local populace through: the imposition of strict Sharia (Islamic law); attacks against perceived collaborators with counterinsurgent forces and their governments; governance via local governors and ruling committees; and a certain degree of ingratiating themselves among the populace by creating a more secure environment for the villages against local bandits and criminals. As the Washington Post reported, ?In the tribal areas of North and South Waziristan?from which U.S. and Afghan officials say many cross-border attacks are staged?these groups have even been able to establish parallel power systems, according to some observers. ?They have appointed local commanders? and civilian councils, said Afrasiab Khattak, a human rights and political activist. ?They have lynched bandits from trees and dragged their bodies from vehicles. They have killed dozens of tribal leaders and threatened to kill anyone who collaborates with the government as a spy.??
As noted in past analyses in these pages , cultivating a degree of popular support remains one of the critical elements, if not the sine qua non, of ?winning? insurgent and counterinsurgency campaigns. The base of popular support serves to provide a clandestine operating environment for insurgent groups amid the camouflage of the society and provides further operational support in the form of clandestine safehouses, logistical and materiel smuggling networks, intelligence networks and sources, and recruitment pools.
Thus, the consolidation of a measure of societal support for, or at least acquiescence toward, Taliban operations?either through genuine popularity and support, intimidation and coercion, or some combination thereof?provides an extremely advantageous element to the group’s resurgence, entrenchment, operational strength, and durability as an insurgency.
Adding to these factors and dynamics is the recent warning by fugitive Taliban leader Mullah Omar that with the spring thaw would come a Taliban offensive. Thus, reports seem to indicate that the Taliban insurgency is entrenching its control over areas of the borderlands; likely enjoying operational enhancements via a degree of societal support or acquiescence and the infusion of weapons, materiel, and mujahideen fighters; and will likely wield these operational measures in a spring/summer offensive.
