The above report may represent the early indicators of a potential shift by some Iraqi Sunni elements back to an alignment with foreign jihadists, and in particular the jihadist network of Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi and a more classic insurgent posture against the Iraqi government and US forces. Based upon the report, this possible shift would seem to have been provoked by the apparent reprisal killings of Sunnis?perceived as being perpetrated by Shia militias?following the bombing of the Shia shrine in Samarra , the apparent disinterest and/or inability of the government security forces to staunch the violence against Sunnis, and Zarqawi?s political and tribal maneuvering to cultivate support from among Sunnis. Should these dynamics continue?particularly, continued sectarian violence against Sunnis?it would underscore the potential for a larger shift of Sunnis to the insurgency and have significant deleterious effects on Iraq?s security and stability by further catalyzing the hardening of sectarian divisions and conflict, and infusing the insurgency with fighters and societal support.
Recent WAR Reports covering Iraq have noted with optimism the seeming shift of the Sunni community and some more moderate Sunni insurgent elements away from hardcore insurgent activities or support?indeed, with reports of Sunni insurgents turning against foreign jihadist fighters?and toward political negotiations and participation in the government and political processes . This shift was encouraged and enticed by offers of political empowerment by the Iraqi government and US officials as a critical counterinsurgency strategy aimed at sapping the insurgency of a large segment of its Sunni guerrillas and societal support, and, in turn, isolating the foreign jihadist fighters. However, key to this strategy was convincing these Sunni elements that the current political mechanisms and government presented a viable avenue for Sunni empowerment and the pursuit of Sunni communal interests . Further, Sunnis had to be convinced that the Shia and Kurd dominated government would wield its political and martial powers to ensure the security of the Sunni community against rival sectarian militias. As earlier TRC analyses in these pages have noted, if the Sunnis did not perceive that these circumstances were likely or viable, they would likely, in turn, retreat to classic, anti-government insurgent activity as a vehicle for pursuing Sunni communal security and interests. As the 27 July 2005 WAR Report noted:
Should continued attacks along sectarian lines prove too much to bear for each community or its cooperation in governance and society be perceived as not worth the price?in both cases either in sectarian communal security terms or political terms?the ethno-religious communities may begin the cascading retreat into ethno-religious sanctuary and with it a descent into sectarian conflict. This prospect is particularly dangerous to Iraq?s national security and counter-insurgency efforts if the Sunni community, perceiving itself as being targeted at the hands of the Shia-Kurd-dominated government and its security forces, abandons its involvement in the government and turns to support the largely Sunni insurgency, fragmenting Iraq into a de facto civil war.
Thus, against the backdrop of a stumbling and unstable government, weak and to a degree corrupted national security forces, and the roiling sectarian violence pushing Iraq to the precipice of all-out civil war, it would seem plausible that elements of the Sunni community and insurgency may be disillusioned with the prospects of realizing communal interests and achieving communal security via the national government and its forces and perceive their most advantageous recourse as a retreat to the insurgency. It is not clear how large a segment of the Sunni community may have been driven to the insurgency as a result of the current political and sectarian environment in Iraq and/or Zarqawi?s maneuvering, nor is it clear the number of Sunni elements allied with Zarqawi and other foreign fighters.
The seeming ebb and flow of Sunni insurgent and societal elements between anti-government insurgent violence, sectarian conflict, and political negotiations and participation seems to provide a trenchant indicator of the strength and vigor of the insurgency in Iraq, the level of sectarian fighting, and the stability of Iraq?s government. This possible shift by Sunni elements to more squarely support and participate in the insurgency, and possibly ally themselves with foreign mujahideen, would represent a profoundly negative development for counterinsurgency efforts, the prospects for civil war, and Iraq?s national cohesion and stability.
As sectarian demarcation lines become increasingly stark and underpinned by militia violence, Iraq is well on its way toward a cascading spiral of sectarian conflict and civil war, and the potential fracturing of the country into three ethno-religious provincial groupings?the Kurds in the North; Shia in the south; and Sunnis in the center-West. Thus, as critical ?fulcrum? actors in Iraq?s security and stability, the Sunni community and insurgent elements? behavior in the coming weeks will have uniquely significant impact on shaping the political environment, the strength of the insurgency, and the level of sectarian conflict.
