Early in 2005, as Iraqi elections approached, fears of an election day marred by terrorism overshadowed another, quieter dread felt in a number of neighboring Arab regimes. For the first time, Shia Muslims would make up the legitimate dominant power in an Arab country. There were concerns that the majority Shia in Sunni-dominated Bahrain would also get a hankering to take power in their country and that in Lebanon , where Shia form the largest confessional group, there would be renewed aspirations to take more power.
These fears were not new. When the Islamic Republic in Iran , a Shia theocracy, seized power from the secular government 15 years earlier, Arab regimes were concerned that their Shia populations would be inspired by the revolution and would try to either take more power or would turn into ?fifth pillars,? loyal to the new Iranian regime. For the most part, however, that did not happen, perhaps because the utopian vision advertised by the Islamic Republic was eventually revealed to be a sham of tyranny and economic failure or perhaps because political connections between the Arab Shia and their Persian counterparts were not that strong after all.
The Shia-dominated Iraqi government is about a year old, and the model of Shia empowerment does seem to have animated Shia populations in the Arab world, especially in Bahrain. However, threats to existing governments and national stability remain in check almost everywhere. Further, the increased politicization seems inspired by Shia success in Iraq , not, as this article implies, by civil strife. Logically, it is a successful Shia government that produces aspirations for greater power, not a failed one. The example currently being set in Iraq is one that other Arabs?whether Sunni or Shia?do not want to follow. If anything, Shia-Sunni violence in Iraq will probably lead to greater efforts in other Arab countries for mutual understanding.
For example, as this article pointed out, the disastrous destruction of the Golden mosque in Samarra led Saudi Arabia to issue condolences to clergy of its oppressed Shia minority. Lebanon commenced a National Conciliation Conference in order to stave off sectarian violence (see this WAR Report). Shia in Bahrain, while discriminated against heavily by the ruling Sunni minority, have been steadily given greater freedoms over the past several years.
It is perhaps Bahrain that is most threatened by Shia power aspirations. For this reason, as well as Bahrain?s relationship with the US , the effects of the Shia government in Iraq on Bahrain, specifically, is the most important for the US to monitor. It is also crucial to develop an understanding of Bahraini politics that goes beyond what is so often characterized as a simple case of an oppressive minority ruling over a beleaguered majority.
Estimates of numbers of Shia in Bahrain fall between 60 and 70 percent, although it is suggested that the actual number may be higher. In Bahrain, the moderate group of ruling Sunni Muslims resists Shia empowerment partially because of competing visions for the future of that country. The ruling Khalifa family has turned Bahrain into a model of modernity in the retrograde Gulf, with more liberal social laws and mores, successful programs of economic and financial reforms, and successful economic diversification. In 2001 and 2002, a constitutional reform program was passed that made Bahrain a constitutional monarchy, gave women the right to hold legislative office, protected fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals, and fostered efforts to expand and deepen civil society. In a symbolic demonstration of tolerance unusual for an Arab country, let alone a Gulf Arab country, a seat in the national parliament is reserved for a small Christian minority as well as one for the Bahraini Jewish population, although it numbers hardly more than 30 people. The tiny island also remains an important US ally, with 79 acres of its capital city allotted to the US military.
The Sunni minority, as well as a small group of socially upwardly mobile Shia who have joined them as part of the Bahraini elite, worry that a Shia government inspired by Iran or even Iraq would destroy such progress, endanger the relationship with the US, and mar Bahrain?s image as a modernized, tolerant, economically successful country. Bahrain?s government seemed to be pleading with its Shia population, ?please don?t embarrass us,? when it issued a statement to Shia leaders before this year?s bloodletting ceremonies during Ashoura asking Shia ?to take advantage of expanded rights in a positive way and stay away from anything that would hurt Bahrain?s reputation?? Of course, for Sunnis of Bahrain to get the Shia population on board for their progressive vision, they have to convince them that the opportunities brought by progress will be available to all Bahrainis, regardless of confession.
The situation of Shia in Arab countries differs from country to country and should be looked at in each case with nuance. It is most important for the US to pay close attention to signs of political conflict in Bahrain, as an ascendant Shia population could desire to bring an end to Bahrain?s long-standing good relations with the US. The Shia population in Lebanon could also muddle US-Lebanese relations. In Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom?s oppression of its Shia minority is only one item on a long, dark list of crimes and backwardness in what is a largely failed system of government. In Kuwait , the ruling family seems well-poised to handle any issues of national unity that might arise. The tendency to analyze Arab nations and their populations in bulk will not serve our understanding well, especially when it comes to looking at the ramifications of post-war Iraq throughout the region.