More was publicly and authoritatively revealed about the history and current operations of Jemaah Islamiya (JI) in the past week than has been discussed in the past three and one-half years when the first Bali bombing brought the group to the attention of Westerners in October 2002. The occasion for the terrorism seminar and related press conference was the opening of the Transnational Crime Centre in Jakarta, Indonesia ?an intelligence fusion operation funded in part by Australia , providing at least A$4 million over the next four years?the center will link 30 facilities across Indonesia to counter terrorism, drug and human trafficking, cyber crime, money laundering, and perhaps even piracy. Col. Petrus Reinhard Golose, deputy chief of Indonesia’s Detachment 88 anti-terror police task force, was the primary source for most of the revelations, which thus carry significant weight. He openly discussed the group’s links to al-Qaeda , JI’s new operational leader, the emergence of Noordin Mohammad Top’s new faction Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad , and greater detail on JI’s modus operandi .
Al-Qaeda links to JI have long been alleged. The 9/11 investigation quickly illuminated that a significant planner and logistician was Indonesian Riduan Isamuddin, better known as Hambali, of Jemaah Islamiya. Since Hambali’s capture in Thailand in August 2003 , details have been slow to emerge publicly regarding the nature and extent of his dual role within both organizations. However, Goloses’ revelations this week concretely link personnel, training, and funding between the two groups. Although Osama bin Laden did not formally return to Afghanistan until 1996, his network and funding was supporting the Afghanistan Mujahidin Military Academy through which such JI luminaries as Hambali, Noordin Mohammad Top, Top’s recently killed operational co-leader Malaysian-born Dr. Azahari bin Husin, and new JI leader Ainal Bahri?better known by his nom de guerre, Abu Dujana?all passed through the training facility as early as 1991. Golose confirmed that senior al-Qaeda planner Khalid Shaikh Mohammed admitted to a courier network funneling funds from Thailand through Malaysia to Sumatra Island for use in the first Bali bombing (RealNews), the subsequent attacks against Jakarta’s Marriott hotel in 2003 , the Australian Embassy in Jakarta (September 2004), and the second Bali bombing in 2005 . The first Bali bombing was said to have cost some $30,000, and nearly as much had been used in the Marriott attack, with leftover funding utilized against the Australian Embassy attack.
The alleged emerging leadership role of Abu Dujana is not accepted by all analysts. The 37-year old former teacher is thought by some to be too young, mild-mannered, and inexperienced to lead the group. Nonetheless, former JI members confirm Dujana is a veteran of the Afghan war and is knowledgeable of operational tactics such as assaults and bomb-making. Within JI, Dujana has served as secretary and treasurer. He is from Cianjur, the same West Java town as Hambali, and later taught on the faculty of the Lukmanul Hakiem Islamic boarding school set up by the JI leadership in Malaysia’s Johor with Noordin Mohammed Top. Col. Golose notes that Dujana’s ascendance comes in the wake of the imprisonment of previous JI leaders Abu Bakar Bashir jailed in 2002 and Abu Rusdan (aka Thoriqudin and Hamzah) incarcerated in 2003. Published reports suggest that Noordin and Azahiri briefed Dujana before and after the Marriott bombing in 2003. Yet, how much influence Dujana will have on Noordin’s new group is not known.
Indonesian police chief General Sutanto revealed in February 2006 that Noordin’s followers were split into groups to focus on particular tasks, such as security, intelligence, and logistics. Despite the arrest of over 200 JI members in recent years as well as perhaps 30 individuals knowledgeable of Noordin’s activities since the creation of the new group , Noordin is thought to be lying low and marshalling resources. A treasure trove of intelligence gathered from the safehouse where Azahiri was killed in October 2005 suggests that Noordin is learning and improving operational procedures and increasing security. A recent 33-page Indonesian intelligence report suggests that suicide bombers are still actively recruited by Noordin through Islamic study groups. Additionally, the three suicide bombers of the 2005 Bali attacks carried detailed instructions on how to pick their targets and trigger the explosives. The bombers chose their targets from four alternatives including discos, hotels, and cafes frequented by tourists in Bali just weeks before the attack. Yet, despite learning from previous operations not to establish a safe-house close to the target, authorities tracked evidence from the 2005 bombings much more quickly, resulting in the death of Azahiri and the short-term disruption of Noordin’s operation.
There are three likely avenues of future attacks by JI and Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad. First, it makes sense that the groups will continue apace with at least one significant bombing of a prominent Western target each year?likely in Jakarta or Bali?probably in the August to October following the pattern of the previous four years. Second, if Noordin is truly trying to establish his own al-Qaeda franchise in a manner similar to that of Abu Musa?ab al-Zarqawi’s renamed Al Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers in Iraq , he may acknowledge some broader al-Qaeda strategic goals by attacking targets affiliated with countries in the Iraq Coalition, oil or energy targets, or perhaps even shipping facilities. Finally, if the first attack attributed to Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad is to provide any guidance about future activity, a wave of small attacks against Christian targets may be planned to ferment religious clashes as a means to foster the creation of an Islamic state of Malaysia , Singapore , Indonesia, and the southern Philippines . Of the three, the first is most likely, and Western interests should be particularly vigilant in both Jakarta and Bali. Nonetheless, strategic Western industries such as oil, energy, and transportation (especially air) could invariably soon be targeted.