There are a number of pragmatic reasons to cooperate closely with Algeria on counterterrorism initiatives. First, a significant number of foreign fighters in Iraq are Algerians. Some of these fighters may be members of Algeria?s al-Qaeda-aligned terrorist group, the Salafist Group for Call and Combat . That organization is also attempting to cultivate or strengthen ties with Abu Musaab al-Zarqawi?s network in Iraq to carry out terrorist operations.
Of primary importance is the fact that Algeria is a key source of liquid natural gas (LNG) for the United States as its second largest foreign source. There is concern over protecting the infrastructure that facilitates these exports. This concern is coupled by fears over the security of LNG-filled tankers coming into US ports from Algeria.
From another perspective, Algeria is something of a success story in defeating an Islamist insurgency that snowballed into a civil war waged throughout the 1990s. Algerians were divided sharply between those who supported the Islamists and those who supported the secular government at the time. Those wounds appear to be healing as a large majority of Algerians voted recently to accept the secular, Bouteflicka-led government and put the civil war behind them . There may be lessons for the US and the nascent Iraqi government to learn from the Algerian experience in battling its own Islamist insurgency.
For instance, the Algerian insurgents began to lose ground when they instituted a policy of massacring whole villages that supported the government. What was perceived as indiscriminate killing turned Algerians against the Islamists, who were once seen as a pro-democracy, legitimate political party. The policy of massacring Algerian civilians also led to deep fractures in the Islamist insurgent groups because many disagreed with the policy, further weakening the insurgent front. The same situation may be observed to be happening in Iraq, whereby Abu Musaab al-Zarqawi?s policies of targeting Iraqis are leading to similar problems for the insurgency (Terror Web Watch).
While there are pragmatic reasons to support the secular Algerian government and work closely with President Abdelaziz Bouteflicka , the timing for US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to visit Algeria and make a public showing of support may be counterproductive to other initiatives in the Muslim world. While Americans may see Bouteflicka as a successful example of a president who healed a country wrought by Islamist conflict, he is not viewed as such in the Arab world and even the greater Muslim world. Algeria is unlike other cases of Islamic insurgency around the world. The Islamist party in Algeria, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), was poised to win the 1992 election and accede to power via peaceful, democratic means. The secular government canceled the elections, killing what would have been the development of democracy in Algeria. This is what the Algerian government is best known for outside Algeria, and US support for a regime that killed a burgeoning Arab democracy when it threatened to bring forth an Islamist government has uncomfortable parallels to modern developments in the Palestinian territories and Egypt . Public and publicized displays of support for Bouteflicka will likely be perceived in the Arab world as an indication that the US is backtracking in its democracy promotion effort when that effort threatens to bring Islamists to power. Further, Rumsfeld?s comments that the Algerian secular regime should not be judged so harshly for its activities during the civil war are also in poor taste. The Algerian civil war was a competition in barbarism on both sides that culminated in the loss of 100,000 lives. The government, too, made villages disappear and is believed to have kidnapped and killed thousands, if not tens of thousands. This reputation has stayed with the Algerian government in the greater Middle East, and comments appearing to treat this violence lightly will not be perceived well. The visit is in indication of how the US government faces difficulties in forging and maintaining important relationships and alliances while at the same time controlling their image in the region to support a larger Middle East public relations imperative.