Beijing recently released a white paper, China’s Law-Based Cyberspace Governance in the New Era, in which it presents its views on the future of the Internet, emphasizing the importance of a rules-based approach and quickly linking China’s successful development to the adherence of such values. The white paper stresses key areas to include but are not limited to upholding the rule of law in cyberspace, consolidating the system for Internet governance, “defending fairness” in cyberspace, promoting public awareness, and increasing international exchanges and cooperation when it comes to cyberspace governance. The white paper identifies the three stages of cyber legislation in China from the country’s initial connection to the Internet, to network infrastructure security, and mobile technologies, showing a gradual but steady development.
Satisfied with these developments, what can be considered the fourth stage is Beijing’s current concentration on global cyber governance. China uses the white paper as a way to not only promote itself as a responsible actor on the global stage, a frequent them in its communications to the international community, but also to demonstrate that its adherence to a law-based cyberspace approach to governance has been instrumental in its own overall strategy and success in cyber-related matters. Indeed, the white paper references how China’s laws have been critical in Beijing’s internal cyberspace governance because they have been positively used to help the government create a government-business-society sector relationship in which robust supervision and enforcement, the balancing of freedom and order, as well as openness and autonomy, has harmonized the symbiosis between the three. In essence, China is using its own “pioneering” approach as an applicable model by which all nations should emulate to achieve similar results.
However, some will contend, and perhaps correctly so, that the white paper merely firmly underscores Beijing’s commitment to robust control over information and information systems via the passage of various laws over the past few years. Even China’s Deputy Director of the State Council Information Office, the government body behind the white paper, acknowledged that China’s Internet policy must always “uphold the party’s overall leadership over the rule of law work on the internet. Implement the requirements of the party governing the Internet and implement the party’s leadership throughout the entire process.” China has never denied the strictness of its monitoring, only the intent behind it, even praising itself for its censorship capabilities in blocking what it deemed fake news content related to the Chinese Communist Party by unauthorized media as recently as February 2023.
Still what others consider information control, Beijing considers diligence in combating the negative effects of what it considers “disinformation” hostile to its interests, a sentiment that even Western countries have pointed out to be potential threats. Using this as an anchor, Beijing fosters the narrative that it is taking tough action against illegal behaviors in cyberspace, using the same nomenclature as its contemporaries, even if it’s from a different perspective. Given this gift of Western (read: democratic) governments seeking to implement the same restrictions as Beijing not only strengthens its arguments for doing so, but raises its stature as a leader in this area. Therefore, Beijing is able to maintain that these efforts, as well as its cyber laws , have contributed to creating a sound cyber environment and maintaining order online,. Beijing quickly points out in the white paper that “rules of cyber adjudication have improved, more online cases have been handled, and justice is served in cyberspace as elsewhere.” These cyber laws have guided China’s citizens, accordingly, raising their awareness to cyber threats as what responsible online behavior looks like, at least in the government’s eyes.
Amidst an online environment that looks more like digital chaos via the ongoing cyber conflicts between Russian and Ukrainian government actors and online sympathizers, as well as a robust cybercrime ecosystem, Beijing is attempting to offer one way to reduce such threats through a law-based prism. The focus on law-based attempts to paint China as a responsible state actor that can be trusted as a global leader and ignoring allegations of its own cyber malfeasance. Per the white paper, Chinese legal initiatives have served two important purposes: one, they protect citizens from cyber crimes, and two, they are the basis by which the government has developed a “high quality digital China,” which has fueled China’s digital economy, ranking it second in the world in 2021. Beijing uses this achievement as a basis to bolster its savviness in recognizing such successes can only be brought about by developing Internet technologies with security in mind, a popular criticism applied to many technology manufacturers. Simply put, China advocates for other states to do as it does, and if more governments follow suit, the online cyber environment would be better for it.
This is consistent with China’s efforts to raise its global stature, and coincides with other efforts such as brokering a historic diplomatic reconciliation between Iran and Saudi Arabia, as well as trying to bring Ukraine and Russia to peace talks. This tracks with its efforts in the cyber sphere where it has for several years tried to influence setting the rules by which nation states behave in cyberspace, how the Internet should be governed, and the standards for the technologies that support the global Internet. China laid out its aspirations in its 2022 white paper titled “Jointly Building a Community with Shared Future in Cyberspace” in which Beijing reinforced its technological development successes, as well as separating itself from the Western vision of an Internet that focuses on individual privacy over the security of the country. What’s more, it is trying to fill a void, stating its intentions to willingly assume the role as a leader in all cyber matters.
The themes are the same as well as the timing. Beijing published the 2022 white paper to serve as a counter point to the United States’ release of its “Declaration-for-the-Future-for-the-Internet” and so it does the same here. Now with its recent cyberspace governance paper, Beijing again seeks to contrast itself against the United States’ National Cybersecurity Strategy. Beijing has skillfully juxtaposed its law-based governance aspirations against the United States’ more aggressive cyber policy of “hunt-forward” operations that ostensibly require actions to strike first against networks that could be in the jurisdiction of other sovereign states. This plays to Beijing’s position of cyber sovereignty that that views cyberspace as a patch-work quilt of state-owned and monitored Internet spaces rather than one borderless space. Laws govern countries, laws govern land, maritime, and air, and therefore, laws should govern the Internet. This is a difficult point to argue against. Determining what those laws are is the complicated part.
Still, Beijing is trying to fill the void of global cyber leader, a de-facto position held by the United States for a long time, and one that Washington has pushed to the backburner the past several years. Beijing wants this role, and badly. By continually making its case to the world through its white papers and the United Nations in the GGE and OEWG, Beijing hopes to gain ground in recruiting others to its side. And the more the status quo in cyberspace languishes – that is, crime, espionage, disinformation, and malicious attacks – the more governments may be more willing to support a law-based approach to reduce these threats. If Washington doesn’t assert itself in places like the UN to match Beijing’s perseverance, it may find itself replaced at the head of the cyber table.
