2021

Total Satellites in Space: 4,852

Total Launches in 2021: 136

Total Tracked Orbital Debris: 30,040

Source: The CSIS Space Threat Assessment 2022

The following is a baseline working definition of counterspace:

“Counterspace is a mission, like counterair, that integrates offensive and defensive operations to attain and maintain the desired control and protection in and through space. These operations may be conducted across the tactical, operational, and strategic levels in all domains (air, space, land, maritime, and cyberspace), and are dependent on robust space situational awareness (SSA)and timely command and control (C2). Counterspace operations include both offensive counterspace (OCS) and defensive counterspace (DCS) operations.” (1)

According to the 2022 DIA Challenges to Security in Space report, “Space is being increasingly militarized. Some nations have developed, tested, and deployed various satellites and some counterspace weapons…As China’s and Russia’s space and counterspace capabilities increase, both nations are integrating space scenarios into their military exercises…the expansion of Chinese and Russian space and counterspace weapons combined with the general rise of other foreign space capabilities is driving many nations to formalize their space policies to better position themselves to secure the space domain and facilitate their own space services.” The inaugural 2019 DIA report was released to “support a deeper public understanding of key space and counterspace issues and inform open dialogue and partner engagement on these challenges.”

A sophisticated report on the issues of Space Security and Counterspace offensive and defensive capabilities has been released this month: the Fifth Annual Space Threat Assessment 2022 from the Center for Strategic and International Studies – which expands on the following foundational thinking on counterspace provided by the 2019 and 2022 DIA reports:

Key Counterspace Concepts: With a country and world increasingly reliant on these space-based services for daily life, countries have worked to develop weapons to target them in the event of war. Cyberspace threats, directed energy weapons for disabling space-based equipment, and electronic warfare technologies using the electromagnetic spectrum to target space-based equipment are three leading threats to space-based critical infrastructure. Ground-based anti-satellite missiles and orbital delivery of anti-satellite weapons also extend the threats into more traditional, kinetic domains.

Key Identified Threats, Including Cyber: The DIA reports identify nation-state actors as the leading threats to American infrastructure in space. “Chinese and Russian military doctrines indicate that they view space as important to modern warfare and view counterspace capabilities as a means to reduce U.S. and allied military effectiveness. Both have developed robust and capable space services, including space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance…Both states are developing jamming and cyberspace capabilities, directed energy weapons, on-orbit capabilities, and ground-based anti-satellite missiles that can achieve a range of reversible to nonreversible effects.

Competition. China’s emergence as a space power in the late 20th and early 21st century and Russia’s post-Soviet resurgence have expanded the militarization of space as both countries integrate space and counterspace capabilities into their national and warfighting strategies to challenge the United States. Beijing and Moscow seek to position themselves as leading space powers, intent on creating new global space norms. Through the use of space and counterspace capabilities, they aspire to undercut U.S. global leadership. Iran and North Korea will continue to develop and operate electronic warfare (EW) capabilities to deny or degrade space-based communications and navigation.

The Counterspace Continuum: DIA succinctly captured the full spectrum of threats to space in a graphic in their report titled “The Counterspace Continuum.” This graphic is reproduced here:

The CSIS’ Space Threat Assessment 2022

This recent CSIS report opens by tieing all of the counterspace activities of the last 70 plus years in a Counterspace Timeline, 1959-2021: “For more detail on past counterspace weapons tests, including historical tests by the United States and the Soviet Union, please review the prior Space Threat Assessments (editions 2018–2021) or visit the Aerospace Security Project’s interactive online timeline at:”

Counterspace Timeline, 1959 – 2021

The SCIS authors expand the working definition of counterspace into four distinct categories.

Kinetic Physical: Kinetic physical attacks attempt to damage or destroy space- or land-based space assets. They typically are organized into three categories: direct-ascent, co-orbital, and ground station attacks. The nature of these attacks makes them easier to attribute and allows for better confirmation of success on the part of the attacker.

Non-Kinetic Physical: A non-kinetic physical attack is when a satellite is physically damaged without any direct contact. Non-kinetic physical attacks can be characterized into a few types: electromagnetic pulses, high-powered lasers, and high-powered microwaves. These attacks have medium possible attribution levels and often provide little evidence of success to the attacker.

Electronic: Rather than attempting to damage the physical components of space systems, electronic attacks target the means by which space systems transmit and receive data. Both jamming and spoofing are forms of electronic attack that can be difficult to attribute and only have temporary effects.

Cyber: Cyber attacks can be used to intercept data, corrupt data, or seize control of systems for malicious purposes. Unlike electronic attacks, which interfere with the transmission of data via radio frequency signals, cyber attacks target the data itself and the systems that use this data. Any data interface in the system is a potential intrusion point, including the antennas on both the satellites and ground stations, as well as the landlines connecting ground stations to terrestrial networks. The effects of a cyber attack on space systems can range from loss of data to widespread disruptions and can potentially lead to the permanent loss of a satellite.

The CSIS researchers provide further analysis of three types of cyber counterspace attacks:

Data interception is a cyber-attack that attempts to collect data as it is transmitted through a satellite system or monitor the flow of data to identify patterns of activity. Such an attack is difficult to attribute, as hackers can successfully hide their identities using proxy servers and other means. A satellite operator may not be aware of the attack when it occurs, or even afterward, but the attacker will have near real-time confirmation of its success.

Example: In 2009, it was revealed that insurgents in Iraq were using commercially available software to intercept and decode video over satellite communication links from U.S. surveillance aircraft. This was possible because some U.S. aircraft did not have the equipment needed to encrypt video feeds, and it enabled the insurgents to see what the U.S. military was seeing in near real-time. (2)

Data corruption can occur when an attacker infiltrates a system and alters the data to show false information. Such an attack is difficult to attribute, as hackers can successfully hide their identities, and can be fully reversible. Again, the satellite operator may not be aware of the attack when it occurs.

Seizure of Control. Cyber attacks can also be used to seize control of a satellite and execute commands on the satellite. This type of cyber attack is also hard to attribute and can be irreversible if the attacker gains complete control of the satellite and executes commands that are unrecoverable. The satellite operator will likely be aware of the attack but may not be able to stop it until it is too late. This attack can cause collateral damage if the target satellite is disabled and left to drift uncontrollably in orbit.

Example: The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission has cited examples in the past in which cyber attacks were used against the command and control systems of U.S. government satellites. According to the Commission’s 2011 report, one of the more successful attacks targeted NASA’s Terra EOS satellite in 2008. (3) On two instances in June and October of that year, hackers reportedly gained control of the satellite for 2 minutes and 9 minutes, respectively, although they did not execute any commands. (4)

The report also highlights and provides an analysis of four events from 2021: “The July 2021 Chinese hypersonic glide vehicle test; the launch and behavior of a new Chinese GEO satellite, SJ-21; the November 2021 Russian direct-ascent ASAT test in LEO; and Russia’s GPS jamming in Ukraine. Two of these events, both conducted by China, are not counterspace weapons tests but received significant press coverage that regularly implied that they could be space or counterspace weapons.” (5)

What to Watch

“A growing trend is the increasing number of countries interested in defensive counterspace weapons.”

In what the CSIS report calls Countering Counterspace, “a growing trend is the increasing number of countries interested in defensive counterspace weapons or active defenses to protect valuable space assets and deter aggression in space. (4b) Over the course of the past five years, more countries have re-organized their national security space enterprises and have begun to speak more openly about defending space assets. This wave of countries includes Australia, China, France, Germany, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States. NATO has also signaled an expanded focus on military operations in the space domain.” (5) The CSIS authors highlight the following geopolitical maneuvers related to space, presented here chronologically:

China has a robust arsenal of space and counterspace capabilities. The 2007 direct-ascent ASAT test and subsequent non-intercept tests have demonstrated that China has further developed this capability. Co-orbital technology demonstrations also prove China’s ability to rendezvous with other satellites in GEO, and likely in LEO. These demonstrations are not counterspace weapons tests per se but prove that China has the experience and know-how to operate co-orbital counterspace weapons. Similar to many countries, including Russia and the United States, non-kinetic counterspace weapons, such as lasing or high-powered microwaves, remain either classified or have not been tested. However, China has proven it has a growing suite of jamming and spoofing electronic warfare capabilities to be used against space and non-space signals alike. Little is known about China’s cyber counterspace capabilities, but as has been stated in previous iterations of this report, China’s cyber capabilities in other domains form a solid foundation for potential cyber counterspace capabilities as well. (5b)

A key trend to watch in the coming year is whether NATO members and other non-NATO allies continue establishing national space commands and military space units to focus more directly on the challenges they face in the space domain.

With the establishment of the U.S. Space Force in 2019, conversations about how to better protect valuable space assets, such as GPS and ISR satellites, have provided insight into the priorities of the newest military service and how it views the utility of defensive counterspace capabilities.

In 2020, NATO members decided to establish a joint space center in Ramstein, Germany, to coordinate the allies’ space activities, as well as a Space Center of Excellence in Toulouse, France. (7)

In 2021, Germany stood up a military space unit, joining other NATO members, namely the United States, United Kingdom, Italy, and France, in taking similar steps. France has
also publicly stated its intent to develop defensive anti-satellite laser weapons which would be able to blind, but not destroy, an adversary’s satellite. (9)

the U.S….is also…discussing the advantages of building better protections against counterspace attacks. In June 2021, chief of space operations General John “Jay” Raymond publicly stated that the Space Force was pursuing research and development of directed-energy weapons to defend satellites from attack. (10)

At NATO’s 2021 summit in Brussels, leaders announced that an attack on a NATO member’s space assets could result in an invocation of Article 5, which provides that an attack on one ally is an attack on all. (6)

Russia possesses counterspace weapons in all four categories: kinetic physical, non-kinetic physical, electronic, and cyber. Russia has demonstrated its
kinetic capabilities frequently, including the November 2021 test of a direct ascent ASAT weapon and successful co-orbital ASAT missions. Russia has maintained non-kinetic physical counterspace weapons through systems such as the Peresvet high-powered laser. Its electronic warfare capabilities have been on display in conflict areas where mobile electronic attack systems are jamming satellite communications and GPS signals over wide areas.

In January 2022, NATO published its first public space policy for the alliance, which notes that potential adversaries are pursuing a wide range of counterspace capabilities designed to impair NATO’s access to space. (8)

China is also investing in defensive counterspace technologies. A recent article by Chinese scientists announces that they have pioneered a way for satellites to remain operational during and after an HPM or EMP attack. This new technology protects and absorbs the extra electromagnetic energy in order to protect the satellite’s electrical circuits. (11). As the threat of counterspace weapons proliferates, and as China becomes increasingly reliant on its own space systems for economic activity and national security, researching and integrating defenses into satellites will become a more important consideration.

What Next?

Here are our recommendations for mitigating space threats to your business provided by our team:

The Russian Offensive Counterspace Threat. In February 2022, the director of the U.S. National Reconnaissance Office, Christopher Scolese, warned of potential Russian cyberattacks against commercial and government satellites, urging satellite operators to “ensure that your systems are secure and that you’re watching them very closely because we know that the Russians are effective cyber actors.” (12)
Assess your dependence on space. This includes understanding how your business and supply chain use space to communicate, as well as any inputs to your decision-making process that come from data collected from assets in space.
After assessing your dependence on space assets, assess space-related risks. We recommend doing so through scenario-based evaluations involving the materialization of risks.
Decide who in the executive team is responsible for understanding and mitigating risks due to war in space. Ensure appropriate governance over actions related to space including processes that depend on space.
Ensure the leadership team of your organization is involved in developing response and recovery plans tailored to your dependence on space and the risks to your business. Document response and recovery plans as part of your overall disaster recovery process.
Develop incident response processes aligned with your business. This may include leveraging your internal Security Operations Center as a hub of information during an incident.
Practice incident response – including periodic executive-level tabletop exercises that run through scenarios of space-based incidents.
Periodically evaluate your space incident response plans and dependence on space by using independent evaluation, verification, and validation services.
Ensure you are collaborating with peer organizations, including your sector’s Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC), and ensure space topics are being discussed in these venues.