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The February 2022 OODA Network Member Meeting: Topics Included Crypto Innovation, Security and Regulation and the Lead Up to Putin’s War

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To help members optimize opportunities and reduce risk, OODA hosts a monthly video call to discuss items of common interest to our membership. These highly collaborative sessions are always a great way for our members to meet and interact with each other while talking about topics like global risks, emerging technologies, cybersecurity, and current or future events impacting their organizations. We also use these sessions to help better focus our research and better understand member needs.

To encourage openness of discussion, these sessions take place with Chatham House rules, where participants are free to use the information in the meeting but are asked not to directly quote or identify other participants (we also keep privacy in mind when preparing summaries of these sessions, like the one that follows).

The February call was held on Friday, February 18th, and began with a discussion of the national security implications of cryptocurrency national security risks associated with Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies and Bitcoin being used as a Cash Return on Investment (CRI) for the larger ecosystem – based on OODA CEO Matt Devost’s recent post on the topic.



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Is Bitcoin a National Security Risk?

Topics for discussion on the February monthly call were:

  • Crypto and National Security
    • Recent Events In Canada
    • Impact on the U.S. Dollar as a Global Reserve Currency
    • Lack of Tracking Granularity as Wealth Moves
    • Use in Ransomware and Consumer Fraud
    • Lack of Fiduciary and Legal Liability for Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) and  Decentralized Autonomous Corporations (DAC)
    • Will Overregulation Stifle Innovation?
    • Or Is Innovation Fostered by More Transparency?
    • Impact on the Insurance Market and Mitigating Risk
    • Will Punitive De-banking Stymie Regulation?
    • The Bitcoin Origin Story Does Not Include the Crypto Exchange Ecosystem
    • Past is Prologue – Bulletproof Exchanges
  • Ukraine
    • Putin’s Strategy
    • Something Is Happening Here:  The Modern Way of War
    • Putin’s Objective
    • The Difference Between Capabilities and Intentions
    • Putin’s Psychology – Risk Averse or Risk Seeking
    • Give Then An inch, They Take a Foot
    • Ukrainian Resistance Will be Met by Russian Brutality
    • Cybersecurity Implications for the C-Suite
    • It is an Inside Job
    • Open-Source Intelligence/Private Sector Companies May be Targeted
    • What Is an Act of War and What is a Covered Event?
    • Watch Taiwan
    • What Role Afghanistan?

Crypto and National Security

Recent Events In Canada:  How do we update this research with what we have we see up in Canada RE:  the invoking the emergency powers act and going after financial resources  – and some of the issues they have had around cryptocurrencies?  With the timing of the upcoming Executive Order and what has been happening in Canada with GoFundMe reversal funding, etc. –  and the source of funding being an issue – this will then the move into the cryptocurrency space and the associated issues with crypto.

Impact on the U.S. Dollar as a Global Reserve Currency:  More long-term and highly speculative, the economic benefits of the U.S. dollar serving as a global reserve currency could be diminished with the widespread adoption of Bitcoin as a store and exchange of value.  Several nation-states have or are looking to recognize Bitcoin as a currency or as legal tender and several U.S. state initiatives are also underway.  The secondary challenge here for the U.S. government is ensuring that any inevitable movement to a new reserve currency model is tied directly to the U.S. innovation ecosystem.  The catch-22 here is that any efforts to thwart innovation in this space could create durable national security risks in the future if the U.S. loses innovation advantage by driving key projects to external domiciles or ceding control of critical infrastructure to foreign governments.

Lack of Tracking Granularity as Wealth Moves:  Something that is obviously of concern a key (as we saw with Canada) is the lack of tracking granularity as money moves in the system with the Canadians advising that, as it relates to US-based exchanges, they have the ability to go in and freeze accounts or request information, but as it relates to international or cold storage wallets, et cetera, they don’t have that capability.  Obviously, money moving around for illicit activities, as well as avoiding taxation, will be of concern.

The U.S. government relies on tight controls tracking the movement of money to ensure that proper taxation occurs and to prevent funds from being used for illicit activities.  While blockchains provide a public observable record of the cryptocurrency movement, the destination endpoint can be unknown, obfuscated, co-mingled with other transactions, or even moved across chains.  The government will likely look to put increasing pressure on firms serving as originators in cryptocurrency transactions to identify the receiving party or trigger suspicious activity reports or taxable events if that endpoint is not appropriately associated with a legal entity. This could be increasingly troublesome for cold storage wallet transactions executed by individuals looking for more direct control over the keys.

A key risk for US exchanges like Coinbase or Circle is that they do not know the activities happening on their exchanges. Some kind of Know Your Customer (KYC) for cryptocurrency wallets will need to emerge.

Use in Ransomware and Consumer Fraud:   Cryptocurrencies have facilitated a rampant increase in ransomware targeting consumers and organizations which has already triggered government initiatives to try and reduce this risk  Additionally, the Web3 ecosystem has moved at an unprecedented pace creating a significant gap between existing regulatory and protection frameworks and value flowing into emergent blockchain ecosystems. We’ve tracked over $60b USD in value lost in our Crypto Incident Database and new cases are reported almost every day.  The other piece is the use of ransomware in consumer fraud.  We expect the upcoming Executive Order on crypto will throw that over to CISA for review and discussion.

https://www.oodaloop.com/archive/2022/02/16/web3-cyber-incident-database/

Lack of Fiduciary and Legal Liability for Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) and  Decentralized Autonomous Corporations (DAC):  A little bit more forward-leaning is the lack of fiduciary legal liability and the indexing of DAOs.  Typically in the US legal system, consumers like to have somebody that we can reach out and touch – or at least be able to find out who we can reach out and touch.  Obviously, with the DAO/DAC model that is not possible.  Similar to concerns over asset movement for tracking and taxation purposes, the U.S. government will likely eventually express concerns over accountability and legal liability for Digital Autonomous Organizations/Corporation structures.  These structures allow for codified contracts and autonomous operation on modern blockchains.  The inability to identify a viable legal individual or entity to hold accountable for these DAO/DACs will cause considerable consternation.  It gets codified, it gets put on the blockchain and then it just starts operating autonomously. And unless you’re shutting down the entirety of that blockchain, you’re not going to be able to impact the operation of that DAO.

Will Overregulation Stifle Innovation?  Governments do not have a great track record in an understanding of their role (if any?) in disruptive innovation and technology. Will overregulation end up offshoring a tremendous amount of innovation as well as a tremendous amount of wealth as it exists in these systems?

Or Is Innovation Fostered by More Transparency?  One member shared the following:  “Although I have talked about the KYC issue and some of the anti-money laundering that the US could exert in that space, one of the purported defensive benefits to cryptocurrency was that things are distributed  – and the reality is that’s not actually true in implementation.  We see a lot of centralization – which makes the entire ecosystem vulnerable. And I think regulation – treating it like traditional financial technologies and that kind of transparency and forcing function – is actually going to lead to more innovation from more stability and less vulnerability.

Impact on the Insurance Market and Mitigating Risk: The same member went on to note:  “This market is a continuation in the insurance market. If you look at the intent behind the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) guidance and then look at some of the insurance.  The guidance and regulations are going to be affecting the insurance companies that are largely paying these ransoms.  80% of the $5Mm of ransomware payments in the last couple of quarters has all been paid out by insurance companies – it has provided an incentive and will continue as long as these ransoms are paid out by these victims.  We need to start putting a stranglehold on the noose as the intelligence and national security communities have done on problems just like this. And we will need to continue to use regulating cryptocurrency as a piece of this and that system of accountability.  We are starting to see this from the SEC – in terms of unregulated financial instruments – a larger concern of the effects on our overall economy.  Will cryptocurrency destabilize the US economy, or can it create, create a non-parity of forces?  And I think that is also driving this regulatory activity.  How is your crypto going to affect your material risk factors?  That is another concern.  It is a balancing act:  figuring out a way of not sort of continuing to propagate the problem of ransomware by not paying, or thinking about it as a national security issue from a pure economic stability perspective.”

Will Punitive De-banking Stymie Regulation?  Will regulations be leveraged for political purposes? Can you be de-banked based on political views? Involvement in protests?  If so, and you can do the same thing through cryptocurrency regulation, will it undermine a lot of the perceived value of regulation?  Is it going to make citizens, lobbyists, activists, etc. more resistant to regulation?  Currently, you can be de-banked on the US-based crypto exchanges.

Crypto Meets Ukrainian Conflict:  A member noted that Kraken Exchange CEO Jesse Powell has come out in favor of compliance with the regulatory environment:

In an update since the February call, this issue has conflated with the events in Ukraine:

The Bitcoin Origin Story Does Not Include the Crypto Exchange Ecosystem:  Satoshi’s original white paper does not include a section on exchanges or even cold wallets. This whole ecosystem, exchanges, cold wallets, hot wallets – was added on top much later. And you still don’t need those things to use Bitcoin, right?  And Ethereum you don’t need an exchange?  But a lot of people’s money is on these exchanges.

Past is Prologue – Bulletproof Exchanges:  Another member provided the following historical context: “There are a lot of parallels to the evolution of the early internet.  there was the initial free for all, then cracking down on objectionable content and servers offline, and then it moved overseas, and then different countries started cracking down.  And then you had the concept of bulletproof hosting where we’ll host anything were in the most friendly geography and so on.  Will we see a similar pattern or regulation with Bitcoin?  As for the concept of stifling innovation: is there a significant loss of innovation from regulations that say “these are the transactions and types of payments that are not allowed on a U.S.-based exchange”?  With the ability to prevent transactions with bulletproof exchanges over time?”

Bulletproof exchanges already exist, the issue is they tend to be relatively insecure historically and that relates back to the Web3 Incident Database:  exchanges are being run in strange jurisdictions,  on weird networks, with technology that is not being updated – at which point you are better off just not having your money in an exchange at all.  The cold wallet storage option or running your own node is more secure at that point.  Bitcoin Suisse was mentioned as an example of an attempt to domicile some of these assets to legitimate overseas exchanges.

Ukraine

Note:  This member meeting took place on February 18, 2022.

Putin’s Strategy:  It seems like Putin’s strategy is to use Russian-speaking Ukrainians -who he has given Russian passports – so now he considers dual citizens use them to foment unrest – and continue the shelling of innocence.  And then hope that causes a reaction by Ukraine that can be used to move the Russian military in.

Something Is Happening Here…: This modern way of war is so different than the previous ways it used to be. You could tell when the war began.  How are we going to know when the war began? Did it begin last month? Did it begin yesterday [February 17, 2022] when the shelling picked up?

We Are In The First Open Source Intelligence War

Putin’s Objective:  Putin’s intent is to end up in control of Ukraine, We want to keep thinking strategically a year from now:  what does the environment in Europe look like?  What does the Europe of a year from now look like?  How should we address that?  Is it worth doing a Stratigame on it to come up with several scenarios?  If so, how do we integrate European subject matter experts into the Stratigame?

The Difference Between Capabilities and Intentions:  How do you do deterrence in this day and age?  We are learning an object lesson in the difference between capabilities and intentions.   if you, if you stack up the US or the West against Russia, there’s no comparison.  but they care more about this particular piece of terrain than the West does – so there is no real asymmetry.  There is mention of the first real gray zone war?  One member noted:  “The reality is it means more to [Putin] than it does to the West. As simple as that sounds, we’re almost overlooking the obvious.  If the West put together a concerted effort and really dug in their heels they could stop him easily, but we don’t have anywhere near the national will or the skin in this game to do that.”

Putin’s Psychology – Risk Averse or Risk Seeking: You can’t really compare force ratios. You cannot compare technology.  You cannot compare tactics and strategy. That leaves the idea that it is about the psychology of Putin himself  – and whether he’s risk-averse or risk-seeking.  Is there a part of this where this is gratifying to him? Not an irrational actor per se,  but there is some psychology at play here.

Give Then An inch, They Take a Foot:   In a previous conversation (in our January monthly meeting) we addressed that we didn’t think Putin would make this play unless her thought he could win.  From the previous discussion:

  • Putin’s Mindset: What is our frame of reference for Vladamir Putin? Our usual frame of reference is the United States, democracy political powers, and laws.  That is not Putin’s life.  He had to fight with gangs and corrupt generals.  He basically killed his way to the top. So, someone like that is very different from a CIA analyst studying Russia.  His sense of war is very highly calibrated.  He will only attack if he thinks he can win.  How do we research the conflict in Ukraine with his mindset as a focus?
  • What is the right metaphor for this research?  Many network members have a counterterrorism side of things.  Suffice it to say that interacting with and researching terrorists is ‘different’.  What are the metaphors that apply to Putin?
  • A Study in Leadership: The long-term strategic planning with Putin, in a country run by oligarchs, makes it very unpredictable.  China we see as the continued great power conflict because they have a strategy. They have their planning, they are playing the long game from a legacy perspective, as opposed to more immediate actions which are unpredictable.

A member added to the previous conversation with the following:  “But what if it is really not just about the land? What if there is a psychology to it. It’s a thumb in our eye. It is a thumb in everybody’s eye. And maybe there’s an underlying tactic there saying, ‘You are not going to do this. I have other intentions for you. I’ll leave you alone on the cyber front. If you just let me take Ukraine.’ But if you let somebody do that, don’t you give them an inch and they take a foot?

Ukrainian Resistance Will be Met by Russian Brutality:  A subject matter expert on the call offered that “I think the Russians will be brutal when encountering the Ukrainian resistance if it gets to that.  In light of the reports of the very recent shelling the week of February 14th before the member call took place, another member noted: “Yes. I think shelling kindergartens kind of underscores the fact that yes, they can’t get very brutal.”

Cybersecurity Implications for the C-Suite:  A member spoke from recent experience:  “From a global perspective, I’ve worked with a couple global Managed Service Providers (MSP) that are being impacted by the denial service attacks that have started over the week that are impacting banks – and, to be honest, the service providers to those banks.  As we saw with Petya, the state-on-state interactions are having global ramifications. And that will be true here. A chapter can be written about what modern warfare looks like  – and how we’re seeing the elevation of cyber and kinetic warfare.”

“What do global companies need to do?  What are our equivalent of bunkers and the types of provisions we had during World War II. And now in, in this time, how are keeping terabytes safe drives and places to hide our data?  And the CISA alert on the increased Russian attacks on the defense industrial base?  And, and on some level, these attacks are sort of pedestrian because they are using Office 365 and known vulnerabilities and a lot of Log4J issues.  But on another level, they are completely anomalous because of the timing of the targeted nature of the information. And it is a thumb in the eye, as another member mentioned.  And while I’m not at the State Department, even I can connect the dots. And so there seem to be relationships between these things, and that’s where I think there’s an opportunity for us to think strategically.

It is an Inside Job:  One member noted that disinformation and voter suppression cannot be ignored as variables that are weakening our strategic advantages.

Open-Source Intelligence/Private Sector Companies May be Targeted:  Companies like Maxar may be targeted via cyber or kinetic attacks on satellites.  What are the implications in this new terrain of war?  What is the private sector risk assessment in this new environment?

What Is an Act of War and What is a Covered Event?  Building on the point above and the discussion of the insurance market vis a vis crypto earlier in the call, a member offered the following risk assessment: “From a legal perspective, if you look at cyber attacks, particularly against the defense industrial base and our agencies, and you look at insurance, which is another great piece of this whole puzzle – what is an act of war and what is a covered event? So when we start looking at state-sponsored actors, is that an act of war (which may not be covered by ransomware insurance)?  I think that the regulators do indeed have to do something better. We get caught up in our own great loop of having the best legal system in the world -but also probably one of the slowest.”

Watch Taiwan:  Will China make a move on Taiwan?  And will it be in collusion with the Russians? Is collusion even necessary?  Or are the events in Ukraine simply a permission structure for the Chinese to go into Taiwan?  Is this current conflict a litmus test for Taiwan?  Is economic interdependence with China a big enough counterweight?  Sanctions on China, for example, would be a much different picture than the impact of sanctions on Russia.  The political will stateside for confronting China may be much different than the reaction to sanctions against Russia based on the interdependency economically with China.

What Role Afghanistan?  Are we on a continuum here with the events in Afghanistan last year?  What are the lessons learned for the U.S. and our foes?  We gave up facilities and assets in Afghanistan and we have already given up our embassy in Ukraine.  A member offered this perspective:  “It is almost like we are stepping aside and tacitly acknowledging that they can come in and we can’t stop them.  I gotta believe that the Chinese are watching this. Deterrence has a lot to do with capabilities, but it ultimately has to do with perceptions and the credibility of the deterrence.  If they see us just roll over in Afghanistan and Ukraine I don’t think that that necessarily dictates that the Chinese are going to immediately then make a move on Taiwan, but I think it makes it a hell of a lot more likely.”

Additional Research and Analysis On Cryptocurrency and the Global Regulatory Environment

Web3 Cyber Incident Database – Over the past several years, there has been a rapid emergence of companies, projects, and initiatives in what is broadly categorized as Web3.  While monitoring that rapid innovation, the OODA research team has noticed a disproportionately high number of cybersecurity incidents that have the potential to negatively impact the Web3 innovation ecosystem, disrupt customer adoption of these technologies, and result in consumer and enterprise monetary losses.  OODA has compiled a Web3 incident database based on our research to categorize what compromises are taking place as well as document the cyberattack root causes.

Is Bitcoin a National Security Risk? – The cryptocurrency environment has been fast-moving and volatile resulting in concerns around consumer risk and fraud and the aggregate of these risks could impact economic and national security, but it is also likely the EO will address a broader spectrum of concerns.  How might Bitcoin be framed as a national security risk?  As national security technologists, here is our take on where the government is likely concerned.

Project Hamilton: The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston and The MIT Digital Currency Initiative:  Based on the recent release of our Web3 Cyber Incident Database, we continue with our brief survey of crypto and digital currency initiatives from around the globe, all of which are officially sanctioned to enhance national competitive advantage. Today we provide an analysis of the major central bank digital currency (CBDC) initiative in the U.S., Project Hamilton, which is a technical collaboration between the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston and The MIT Digital Currency Initiative. The Biden Administration is set to release an Execute Order (EO) articulating national security concerns associated with Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies. Project Hamilton is a major applied basic research project which will inform some of the actionable and directional components of the EO when released.

Global Crypto and Digital Currency Initiatives: El Salvador, Panama, and Ukraine – Following is a brief survey of crypto and digital currency initiatives from around the globe, all of which are officially sanctioned to enhance national competitive advantage (in the event crypto overtakes the US dollar as the global reserve currency).  It is the cumulative adoption rate of state-sanctioned crypto and digital currency legalization and regulation that will propel this innovative system for value exchange to the top as the official global currency standard.

Global Crypto and Digital Currency Initiatives: India, Argentina, and Russia– We continue with our brief survey of crypto and digital currency initiatives from around the globe, all of which are officially sanctioned to enhance national competitive advantage (in the event crypto overtakes the US dollar as the global reserve currency).  It is the cumulative adoption rate of state-sanctioned crypto and digital currency legalization and regulation that will propel this innovative system for value exchange as a global currency standard. Today, we cover India, Argentina, and Russia.

The Future of DeFi and Crypto Lending: BlockFi’s $100M Settlement with the SEC – An equal and opposite reaction to the recent onslaught of cybersecurity incidents directed at the Crypto and DeFi marketplace (itemized in our recently released Web3 Cyber Incident Database) are regulatory or market mechanisms designed to enhance the trust relationship between end-users, federal regulators, and the crypto platforms during this evolutionary phase of the Web3 innovation ecosystem. The recent SEC action against Crypto lender BlockFi has been heralded by many in the DeFi innovation community as a seminal moment for the cryptocurrency marketplace.

Open-Source Intelligence Resources

The USGS 2022 List of Critical Minerals:  Moody’s Analytics economist Tim Uy wrote in a recent report:  “The greatest risk facing global supply chains has shifted from the pandemic to the Russia-Ukraine military conflict and the geopolitical and economic uncertainties it has created.”  Our recent “Warning for the U.S. Chip Industry: Russian Retaliation Could Hit Supply of Key Materials” provided a breakdown of the Russian and Ukraine-source material critical to the semiconductor manufacturing process (Neon, Palladium, etc.). In February, The US Geological Survey released the 2022 List of Critical Minerals. Palladium and Scandium are included in the USGS list.

The UNHRC Operational Data Portal – Ukrainian Refugees:  The Human Rights Council is an inter-governmental body within the United Nations system responsible for strengthening the promotion and protection of human rights around the globe and for addressing situations of human rights violations and making recommendations on them. The Operational Data Portal (ODP) was created in 2011 to enable UNHCR’s institutional responsibility to provide any information and data-sharing platform to facilitate the coordination of refugee emergencies.

Bellingcat and the Russia-Ukraine Monitor Map:  Bellingcat (an innovative open-source investigative journalism network and business model) has been in our research arsenal for a while  – ripe for a post to introduce our readers to their tools, investigations, and innovative approach to networked journalism.   The war in Europe has now put Bellingcat in the spotlight, based on the growing popularity of their crowdsourced mapping and monitoring efforts.

Additional Research and Analysis On Ukraine

We Are In The First Open Source Intelligence War:  We are witnessing the world’s first war where open-source intelligence is providing more actionable insights than classified sources. Here are views on what this shift means for governments, businesses, NGOs, and Citizens.

What The C-Suite Needs To Know About The Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community:  Every year the US intelligence community produces a succinct report designed to provide a high-level overview of threats. This is issued to coincide with testimony by the Director of National Intelligence and the biggest agencies of the IC, CIA, DIA, NSA, and FBI.  This year’s report follows the theme that the world is growing in complexity and uncertainty. This complexity and uncertainty occur in an interconnected world where great power competition is clearly underway.

Dr. Scott Shumate Profiles Russian President Vladimir Putin:  This OODAcast is a special edition focused on profiling Russian President Vladimir Putin with Dr. Scott Shumate, who has over 30 years of experience evaluating national leaders, terrorists, spies, and insiders.  Scott shares his unique perspective’s on Putin informed by his extensive experience and insight. Is Putin suicidal? Is he a rational actor? Will he escalate to cyber-attacks? These questions and more are discussed with Dr. Shumate.  Here are the major takeaways from the interview to inform your perspective:  The Putin Profile: Takeaways from our Interview with a CIA, FBI, and Military Psychologist.

Ukraine-Russia War Threat to Space Security Update –  The space security and space war aspects of the current Russian invasion of Ukraine have manifested in various ways since the beginning of the war. However, it was preceded by months of build-up, as massive military vehicle parks were created at various places along the Russian and Belarusian borders – all viewed from space.  The following is an overview list of the various issues that have arisen since the inception of the conflict.

A No-Hype Assessment on Starlink Security: Starlink is a great system, but it was not designed for combat and has limitations when being used in this role. Many mitigation measures are in place that can make it harder on adversaries to exploit these limitations. This post reviews provides insights onto these mitigation measures.

The OODA C-Suite Report: Operational Intelligence for Decision-MakersWhat is the value of an informed decision? At OODA Loop, we seek to surface decision intelligence that provides meaningful perspective for leaders and analysts looking to make the most informed decisions possible. The topics examined in this assessment represent developments that fit the category of operating in a VUCA world, identifying and responding to Gray Rhino risks, or opportunities from advancements in emerging technology domains. These are issues we think our members should be tracking and map to collection requirements for our team to keep you as informed as possible.

John Boyd on Patterns of Conflict and the OODA Loop John Boyd studied. He studied fighter pilot tactics, studied aeronautical engineering, studied bureaucrats and how to avoid their traps, studied evolution and biology, and studied history. And Boyd synthesized in a way that only a real practitioner of war could to produce a briefing called Patterns of Conflict that is still having a big impact on the world today.This post summarizes some key points worth reflecting on as the world views and reacts to the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Thinking Strategically About What Comes Next and How To Mitigate Risk As we have previously mentioned, the Russian aggression against Ukraine will have impacts far beyond the region. All companies and all government organizations (including those at local and state levels) should evaluate the potential impact of these hostilities on operations. We are a nation interconnected with the world by complex supply chains and a global high speed internet and must be ready to deal with impacts.

Twitter List For Tactical Information: This Twitter list of vetted resources that have reported accurately on tactical moves in the Ukrainian theater can be used to quickly capture the gist of a dynamic military situation.

C-Suite Guide: Improving Cybersecurity Posture Before Russia Invades Ukraine: The capabilities of Russia to conduct cyber espionage and cyber attack have been battle tested and are hard to thwart even during daily “peacetime” operations. They include well resourced capabilities of the military and intelligence services and also deep technical expertise in the Russian business ecosystem and in organized crime which operates as part of Russian national power. Proof points of Russian capabilities include the massive and sophisticated Solar Winds attacks which leveraged low and slow, well thought out plans to achieve access to multiple well-protected targets. Ransomware successes by Russian based criminal networks are also instructive as to the capability of Russian cyber threat actors. The use of malicious self replicating code (worms/virus/trojan) to spread malicious code into infrastructure is also well proven with decades of practice including fielding software that replicates from unclassified to classified systems in the military and spreads throughout critical infrastructure. This post goes beyond an articulation of the threat into recommendations leaders seeking to mitigate cyber threats from Russia including threats before, during and after a Ukraine invasion.

What The C-Suite Needs To Know About The Threat To Space Based Systems (and what to do about it): OODA recently updated the analysis below on threats to space based assets (with a focus on what the C-Suite needs to know) because of tensions with Russia and continued testing of satellite destruction capabilities the most recent of which (Nov 2021) caused significant increases in dangerous space debris.  We recommend this be read in conjunction with our report on what the C-Suite needs to know about the cybersecurity threats due to the coming Russian invasion of Ukraine, see links in the document for more.

Will China Replicate Russia’s Cyber Offensives in a Taiwan Reunification?: The current situation in the Ukraine has garnered the world’s attention with stakeholders watching attentively as the crisis unfolds. Such regional hotspots have the potential of spilling over into neighboring countries and pulling in governments from all over the world in some capacity. The threat of armed conflict escalating into a major global engagement is always a possibility. China and Taiwan are eagerly watching the crisis as well, but largely for different reasons. While Taiwan is interested to see how friendly governments come to Ukraine’s aid, China is observing how Russia may go about reclaiming territory of the former Soviet Union, in the attempts of gaining insight into how such an act can be accomplished successfully, should Moscow do just that.

A Warning for the U.S. Chip Industry: Russian Retaliation Could Hit Supply of Key Materials: Russia may retaliate against the U.S. threat of trade sanctions and export curbs by blocking access to key materials like neon and palladium. Ukraine supplies over 90% of U.S. semiconductor-grade neon. This type of supply chain-based retaliation has become a priority concern for the White House, which is encouraging a broad diversification of the supply chain in the event Russia limits access to these key materials.

In 2022, the Strategic Impact of Global Intermodal Supply Chain Gridlock on IT Supply Chain Remains High: The OODA Loop Research Team has been tracking the impact on supply chains from the onset of the pandemic.

Russia’s Long Game, Leadership Lessons, and Learning from Failure: In February of 2021, Matt Devost spoke to Rob Richer, a highly regarded advisor to international executives and global government leaders including several heads of state. Rob has a well-informed perspective on international risks and opportunities and an ability to analyze and distill observations in a way that is meaningful for your decision-making process. In light of the conditions in Europe, this portion of their initial OODAcast conversation is timely and includes a discussion of Richer’s time as the head of CIA Russian Operations, his perspective on U.S./Russian relations (especially the role of cyber), leadership, the role of failure, and decision-making.

Charity Wright on China’s Digital Colonialism: Charity Wright is a Cyber Threat Intelligence Analyst with over 15 years of experience at the US Army and the National Security Agency, where she translated Mandarin Chinese. Charity now specializes in dark web cyber threat intelligence, counter-disinformation, and strategic intelligence at Recorded Future. Her analysis has provided deep insights into a variety of incidents, activities, and strategic moves by well-resourced adversaries, primarily actors operating in China.

The January 2022 OODA Network Member Meeting: Putin, Russia, Gray Zone Conflict Capabilities and The Future of Europe: To help members optimize opportunities and reduce risk, OODA hosts a monthly video call to discuss items of common interest to our membership. These highly collaborative sessions are always a great way for our members to meet and interact with each other while talking about topics like global risks, emerging technologies, cybersecurity, and current or future events impacting their organizations. We also use these sessions to help better focus our research and better understand member needs.

CISA Insights Bulletin Urges U.S. Preparation for Data Wiping Attacks:In what felt like coordinated attacks last Friday, data-wiping malware (masquerading as ransomware) hit Ukrainian government organizations and was quickly followed by an aggressive unattributed cyber attack on Ukrainian government sites. The attacks prompted the release of a CISA Insights Bulletin urging U.S. organizations to strengthen their cybersecurity defenses.

Additional Context on OODA Reporting on Russia’s Military-Technical Maneuvers in Europe: We are conscious of our need to keep our usual variety of News Brief and OODA Analysis, but for obvious reasons, this week is top-heavy with Russian, NATO, and Ukrainian coverage. We intend on keeping our focus on providing the context you need vice the blow-by-blow of major moves. Like in other domains we endeavor to provide the “So What?” and “What’s Next?” you need to help drive your decisions.

OODA Research Report- The Russian Threat: This special report captures insights into the capabilities and intent of the Russian Threat, with a special focus on the cyber domain. Our objective: provide insights that are actionable for business and government leaders seeking to mitigate risks through informed decisions.

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We track the rapidly changing world of technology with a focus on what leaders need to know to improve decision-making. The future of tech is being created now and we provide insights that enable optimized action based on the future of tech. We provide deep insights into Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, Cloud Computing, Quantum Computing, Security Technology, Space Technology. Explore Disruptive/Exponential Tech

Security and Resiliency

Security and resiliency topics include geopolitical and cyber risk, cyber conflict, cyber diplomacy, cybersecurity, nation-state conflict, non-nation state conflict, global health, international crime, supply chain, and terrorism. Explore Security and Resiliency

Community

The OODA community includes a broad group of decision-makers, analysts, entrepreneurs, government leaders, and tech creators. Interact with and learn from your peers via online monthly meetings, OODA Salons, the OODAcast, in-person conferences, and an online forum. For the most sensitive discussions interact with executive leaders via a closed Wickr channel. The community also has access to a member-only video library. Explore The OODA Community

About Daniel Pereira

Daniel Pereira is research director at OODA. He is a foresight strategist, creative technologist, and an information communication technology (ICT) and digital media researcher with 20+ years of experience directing public/private partnerships and strategic innovation initiatives.