


## Olympic Games 2004 Security Planning

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In expectation of December's large scale CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear) threat exercise, a workforce of around 41,000 persons (see graph below for statistical breakdown), received training in order to undertake the venture of security for the 2004 Olympic Games. The Greek Police (Ministry of Public Order) had the overall coordination of the event and set up the **Olympic Games Security Directorate (OGSD)**, which will provide a secure environment to 202 delegations from participating countries: 10,500 athletes; 6,700 team and technical officials; 21,600 media representatives; 5,800 IOC (International Olympic Committee), NOC (National Olympic Committee), and VIP's; and 35,000 sponsors. Planning covers 126 Olympic venues, 28 sports, and a host of cultural events in Athens, in the four Olympic cities, and in all of the Greek prefectures and major urban centers.



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After the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich when Palestinian terrorists kidnapped and executed members of the Israeli delegation, every organizer began focusing on – in addition to standard overall security – the prevention of similar terrorist acts. Internationally, there are typically two types of anti-terrorist units: the Army and the Police forces. In Greece, the units that will undertake the burden of dealing with any potential terrorist activity are the **Special Rapid Development Units** and **First Response Units** of the Greek Police, specifically the **Antiterrorist Unit**, the **Explosive Mechanisms Disposal Unit**, the **Special Negotiators Team**, the **Marksmen Team** and the **Submarine Missions Unit**. The Olympic Training Program includes General Olympic Training, which specifically is:

1. Personnel briefing and awareness-raising;
2. Special training sessions, which aims at the acquisition of the necessary knowledge and abilities and are targeted at the security personnel who will be assigned with implementation of special Olympic actions; and
3. Practical training which is obtained through sport events and exercises and culminates in the familiarization of personnel with modern technology and with the conditions prevailing in the Olympic Venues, in which they will be assigned approximately 40 days before the start of the Olympic games.

The **Olympic Games Security Division** has the full cooperation of Athens 2004 Organizing committee, the Hellenic Armed Forces, International Olympic Committee, National Olympic Committee, Sponsors, neighboring countries and the EU member states. But most important is the cooperation with the **Olympic Advisory Group (OAG)**. This security advisory group, set up for the first time in the history of the Olympic Games, is composed of seven countries (USA, UK, Australia, Germany, France, Spain, and Israel) with significant experience in security issues at major sport events. This cooperation continues with the provision of practical approach, advises in specialized planning fields, and contributes to special Olympic Training and to the exchange of information. As police authorities explained, the Intelligence Communities of the OAG countries participate in the overall planning and suggest that if the “combined forces of the Intelligence Agencies of these countries [CIA, Mossad, British Intelligence etc] cannot prevent a terrorist attack during the Olympic games, no one can, and in the unfortunate event of such an attack, this will not be the result of a deficiency in the overall security planning”.

The Olympic Games Security Division provides the use of outer secure fences, CCTV systems, motion detection sensors, perimeter control, access control points; in order to obtain the maximum security in **Olympic competition and non-Olympic competition venues**. There are going to be two Special Purpose zones, the controlled Entry/Circulation zone and the controlled Parking zone. The **Olympic competition venues** are separated in four categories:

1. Two venue complexes. (Athens Olympic Sports Center and Helliniko Olympic Complex)
2. Fourteen stand alone venues. (Peace and Friendship Stadium, Karaiskaki stadium, Faliro coastal zone Olympic complex, Panathinaiko stadium etc)

3. Four temporary venues. (Marathon Start, Road Cycling in the Athens city center etc)
4. Four venues in the Olympic Cities. (Kaftatzoglio stadium in Thessaloniki, Panthessaliko Stadium in Volos etc.)

The **non-competition Olympic venues** are the following: airports, ports, Olympic village, Olympic hotels, international broadcasting center, main press center, seven media villages, 14 technical officials villages, independent training sites, and ATHOC (Athens 2004 Olympic committee buildings including logistic centers, marshalling yards, etc.)

The security plan would be of no significance if it were not tested so that defects or weak points could be detected and corrected by foreign and domestic observers. This program is being implemented by the **Special Exercise Planning Group** within the Olympic Games Security Division (**OGSD**) that draws on know-how and technique made available through the assistance of experts from Great Britain, an Olympic Advisory Group Member State. Its purpose is to use simulation methodologies, allowing the establishment of conditions of realistic training, of critical decision making procedures under pressure and of cooperation and coordination of involved bodies. A good example is a recent scenario that examined two attacks from a hypothetical Islamic terrorist group at Hilton Hotel, the headquarters of the International Olympic Committee, and in the Olympic Stadium, while also dealing with an earthquake in Athens. This scenario allowed the OGSD to examine the response of the security forces in the most extreme, unpredictable circumstances. In more detail, the official exercises implemented are the following:

**Trojan Horse** (table-top exercise, held in November 2001, using a scenario involving hijacking and bombing incidents);

**Gordian Knot 2002** (table-top exercise, held in May 2002, using a scenario involving airplane hijacking and a bombing incident aboard a floating hotel);

**Rainbow 2002** (“Live” exercise, held in November 2002, using a scenario involving an airplane hijacking on the ground and a makeshift bomb mechanism threat aboard a floating hotel with 1,800 personnel);

**Lernean Hydra** (table top exercise, held in May 2003 using a scenario involving terrorist threat at an Olympic venue, sea vessel piracy, and passengers held hostage, combined with a natural disaster);

**Scenarios** (small “live” exercises at August 2003 Sport Events) and **Golden Glaive 2003** (table top exercise, held on September 2003, using an CBRN threat scenario);

**Blue Odyssey** (Large scale CBRN Threat exercise – December 2003).

Additionally and until August 2004 the following exercises are scheduled:

**Table top and live complex exercise** (March 2004), lasting 20 days with the participation of USA and other OAG countries;

**C41 familiarization and training exercises;**

**General “live” exercise**, scheduled for late May 2004 as a “general rehearsal” with all security forces and operations participating;

**Exercises at every Olympic venue** (adapted to the conditions, requirements, means, equipment, etc of each venue until the beginning of the Games).

Regardless that United States, the most important participant of the Olympic Games and the world leader in security issues after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, is participating in the Olympic Advisory Group (OAG), it seems that the US has adopted an unclear stance on the readiness of Greece as far as security issues are concerned. On one hand, the White House keeps a more critical stance, while on the other, George Tenet, CIA chief, encouraged Greek security to keep up its effort and asked the General Director of Athens 2004 Organizing Committee, John Spanoudakis, not to pay much attention to criticism from the press. According to information from Greek police officials “Olympic Games 2004 are not considered as a possible terrorist target, taking into consideration the fact that Muslim athletes and participants would be present too.” Furthermore, the coordinated attempts orchestrated by Australian companies with several publications in the Australian press, to undermine the ability of Greek companies to provide know-how to China on security issues in the next (2008) Olympic Games, has “upset” the Greek government. Prior to this, the Greek government and the Olympic 2004 Organizing Committee had declared their main interest was in providing the highest security for the 2004 Olympic Games, expressing their indifference for the provision of security know-how to the next organizer, China.

The 2004 Olympic Games, as all the Olympic Games held after World War II, is a virtual reality of a peaceful world. While in Ancient Greece, the belligerents were obliged to stop any conflict during the Olympic Games; in modern times, unfortunately, this is not the case.

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