Security and Political Awareness Report

31 March to 06 April 2014

Overview

The week saw continuing violence throughout the region. The AMISOM and SNA offensive recaptured further Al-Shabaab territory in South-central; more Al-Shabaab movement north was reported and increased Al-Shabaab operations outside of Somalia are reported. Politically, the reporting period saw increased focus on the existing states and once again the conduct of the SNA came into focus.

Security Developments within the reporting period

Security Incidents-Somalia

Date	Details	Situational Map
31.03	1. **Tayeeglow**. Al-Shabaab ambushes AMISOM convoy. 2. **Qoryooley**. SNA Special Forces raid captures 2 Al-Shabaab leaders.	
01.04	1. **Kurta**. Al-Shabaab ambush and block SNA supply convoy to Waajid. 2. **Maxaas**. Al-Shabaab attacks AMISOM base. 3. **Ceel Gaal**. AMISOM attacks Al-Shabaab force. 4. **Mahadaay**. SNA checkpoint attacked by Al-Shabaab. 2 killed. 5. **Shalaambood**. Al-Shabaab ambushes AMISOM convoy.	
02.04	1. **Belet Weyne**. Al-Shabaab attacked AMISOM bases.	
03.04	1. **Bossaso**. Jailbreak by 15 pirates. 13 recaptured, 2 still at large. 2. **Xaraf**. Build up of Al-Shabaab forces. 3. **Ceel Buur**. Al-Shabaab attacks AMISOM base. 4. **Halgan**. Al-Shabaab block road between Belet Weyne and Bulo Burto. 5. **Ag Bascir**. Al-Shabaab ambush and block SNA supply convoy to Bulo Burto. 6. **Bulo Burto**. Al-Shabaab attacks AMISOM base. 7. **Xarardheere**. Build-up of Al-Shabaab forces. 8. **Bossaso**; **Gaalkacyo** and **Garowe**. PAF security operations against Al-Shabaab 20 arrested.	
04.04	1. **Kulunjerer**. AMISOM attacks Al-Shabaab bases. 2. **Jebel**. AMISOM attacks Al-Shabaab bases. 3. **Gal-Hareri**. Al-Shabaab build-up of forces. 4. **Garbahaarey**. Al-Shabaab ambushes AMISOM convoy. 5. **Maxaas**. Al-Shabaab ambush khat transporters. 2 killed. 6. **Kabtan Nas**. Al-Shabaab planning IED attacks between Shalambood and Qoryooley. 7. **Gelgaris**. Build up of Al-Shabaab forces.	
05.04	1. **Ceel Buur**. Al-Shabaab ambushed AMISOM patrol 2. **Adow Urumo**. AMISOM attacks Al-Shabaab base. 3. **Wabxo**. AMISOM attacks Al-Shabaab positions. 4. **Qoryooley**. Al-Shabaab attacks AMISOM patrol. 5. **Marka**. Al-Shabaab attacks SNA base. 6. **Eladi**. Fighting between SNA units. 5 killed 9 injured. 7. **Yasooman**. Build up of Al-Shabaab forces, 350 militants in place.	06.04 1. **Wabxo**. AMISOM captures town from Al-Shabaab. Casualties unknown. 2. **Dab Nar.** Al-Shabaab block road between Ceel Buur and Wabxo. 3. **Ceel Garas.** Al-Shabaab block road between Tayeglow and Xudur. 4. **Alafuutow**. Build-up of Al-Shabaab forces, reports of 170+ militants in place. 5. **Xaawo Gadiid**. Build up of Al-Shabaab forces.

Security Incidents Mogadishu		
Date	**Details**	**Situational Map**
31.03	1. **Heliwa**. AMISOM security sweep to detain Al-Shabaab members.	
01.04	1. **Mogadishu**. Increase in security reports of VBIED threat in capital. 2. **Daynile**. SNP arrest 4 armed men on Afgoye road.	
02.04	1. **Heliwa**. SNA patrol attacked. Casualties unknown.	
03.04	1. **Hawl Wadaag**. Al-Shabaab assassinate government official in Bakara Market. Gunmen escape. 2. **Waaberi**. District Intelligence head injured in assassination attempt.	
04.04	No Incidents Reported	
05.04	1. **Hodan**. Government official injured in IED assassination attempt. 2. **Yaaqshiid**. Female NGO worker assassinated by unknown gunmen. 3. **Hodan**. VBIED explodes near KM4 junction. Casualties unknown. 4. **Dharkenley**. SNA troops attack armed group. 1 killed.	
06.04	No Incidents Reported	

Security Analysis

The week saw yet more changes to the security environment in Somalia with the continuation of the SNA and AMISOM offensives. Broadly speaking, there are 3 main trends.

- AMISOM and SNA offensive action, continuing the trend of the 1st half of March, additional offensive activity was seen with Wabxo falling to AMISOM and SNA troops. There are concerns that the offensives are running out of steam and are being slowed with the need to consolidate and secure liberated areas.
    - To date, Al-Shabaab has lost lose control of; Rab Dhuure; Waajid; Xudur; Buurdhuubo; Birta Dheer; Bulo Burto; Ceel-Buur; Maxaas; Qoryooley and Wabxo.
- The potential risks to security in the Horn of Africa were underlined with a wave of incidents in Kenya.

31.03	1. **Nairobi**. 3 grenade attacks in Eastleigh. 6 killed and 25 injured.
01.04	1. **Nairobi**. Security operations hundreds of Somalis arrested. 2. **Nairobi**. Kenyan Police disarm IED located in Eastleigh.
02.04	1. **Mombasa**. Abubakar Shariff Makaburi cleric suspected of supporting Al-Shabaab assassinated. Gunmen escaped. 2. **Nairobi**. Cleric suspected of supporting Al-Shabaab arrested in Eastleigh with explosive devices.
03.04	1. **Dadaab**. 2 explosions near refugee camp airstrip. Casualties unknown.
04.04	1. **Nairobi**. Son of former ICU financier assassinated. Gunmen escaped.
06.04	1. **Nairobi**. Police find cache of explosive materials in Eastleigh.

- The Kenyan response to these incidents has been the mass detention of Somalis from Eastleigh and the order for all Somalis to return to refugee camps.
    - However, there are stories of Somalis bribing Kenyan police and thus avoiding arrest. The mass detentions have also been blamed in part for rioting in Mombasa.

Political Developments within Reporting Period

The week saw political developments in Puntland, with President Gaas taking steps to improve governance and security in the region. Elsewhere, Somaliland was celebrating official recognition as a nation state; everyone else ignored the announcement as meaningless.

Puntland

Following his election as President, Ali Gaas has really made few changes to the power structure he inherited from President Farole. However, it has become increasingly believed that the structures he inherited and specifically the leaders of those structures are not up to the desired standard. This week saw several changes in Puntland that focused on improving the security situation.

- On 31.03 it was announced that the Galmudug Administration and Puntland had set up a joint security organisation to work together to secure the Mudug region. While the claims over who Mudug belongs to will remain unanswered, cooperation to secure the region, especially Gaalkacyo, could improve the security level throughout the region.
- 02.04 President Gaas fired the Police Commissioner of the Bari Region and then ordered his arrest. According to reports the Police Commissioner was implicated in the assassination of Colonel Jama Afgaduud of the Puntland Armed Forces. The Police Commissioner is believed to have passed information on the Colonel's movements to Al-Shabaab who were able to ambush the Colonel's motorcade with an IED, fatally wounding him.
- 03.03 President Gaas replaced the Governor of the Nugaal Region with a political ally. The replacement seems to have been amicable however, with the former governor offering his full support to his replacement.
- 05.04 one of the last remnants of the Farole Administration was removed. President Gaas announced the termination and replacement of Mohamed Farole- the son of President Farole- as Director of the PMPF.
    - It should be noted that Mohamed Farole was accused of politicising the PMPF and developing it as a private militia for President Farole. There are also reports that Mohamed Farole had been implicated in other offences along with other members of the Farole camp.

At present it is too early to determine whether the changes made will have a positive effect. President Gaas appears to be attempting to improve relations with the regions to the south of Puntland, in all likelihood due to the looming threat of increased Al-Shabaab presence in the Golis Mountains.

Somaliland

It was with great fanfare that Somaliland welcomed the announcement on 03.04 that it had been recognised as an independent nation. While an observer might be fooled into believing the importance of the announcement, it turns out that recognition was purely symbolic and underscored the point that politics is a fickle business.

The scene of the momentous announcement that Somaliland was recognised as a nation came not from the seat of government of a nation, but from a city council chamber; and while momentous, the recognition is purely symbolic. Indeed a cynic might focus on the reason behind the recognition of Somaliland as a nation state as opposed to the decision. The Sheffield City Council is in a tense pre-election period with elections due on 22.05. The council is currently Labour controlled and when the motion to recognise Somaliland as a nation was presented, along with a petition demonstrating sizeable support from the Somaliland diaspora in Sheffield, it seems that the majority of the council decided passing the motion would guarantee additional votes in the upcoming election. In itself the motion that was passed called for "the British Government to recognise Somaliland as an independent state and to encourage other governments around the world to do the same." However, as commentators were quick to point out - although unsurprisingly this didn't include anyone from Somaliland or Sheffield - the motion is completely symbolic. The Sheffield council has no authority to compel the British Government or anyone else to recognise Somaliland as a state.

In Hargeysa members of the Somaliland Government called the motion historical and that they hoped countries would follow suit. However, as has been mentioned before, while Somaliland may well be self-governing and to an extent self-supporting there is little support for the idea that it become an independent nation. Somaliland occupies a grey area. In practical terms it is treated as a separate nation from Somalia. For example Djibouti and Ethiopia have both signed security cooperation treaties with Hargeysa. The Federal Government negotiates with Hargeysa and, although the Federal Government's position is that it does not consider Somaliland as an equal, its actions undermine its position.

At the same time as Somaliland was recognised as a state in Sheffield negotiations regarding the management of Somalis airspace were taking place in Istanbul. These talks followed on from the 5th round of negotiations in Istanbul in January and were supposed to reach an agreement on the implementation of air traffic control measures. However, due to technical disagreements the talks ended without an agreement being reached. While the lack of agreement will not affect air travel into Somalia on the whole, the inability of the 2 sides to agree could result in tit for tat dispute similar to that seen in 2013 and early 2014. In mid-2013 we saw Somaliland refuse access for UN flights on the basis that the Federal Government had approved them and we have also seen Somaliland refusing to recognise passports issued by the Federal Government.

Political Situation Forecast

Political Related Forecast

- The development of the security situation is a concern, affecting all other potential growth in Somali; indeed PM Ahmed has stated that security is his number one priority. Despite the success that AMISOM has had in liberating areas from Al-Shabaab, there has been little reduction in the ability to conduct guerrilla attacks and continue to influence Somalia.
    - The security situation in Mogadishu will continue to be a focal point in Somalia and any setbacks in security in Mogadishu will undermine confidence in the government.
    - Outside of Mogadishu and the towns Al-Shabaab continues to have influence on the populace and until rural areas are secured will continue to exert significant influence.
- Federalism and relations between Clans look to be the source of tensions ahead. We have already seen in the last week that Clan violence remains a high threat and there are signs that the growth of Federalism is being subverted by Clan interests and will lead to violence.
    - The argument over who governs the south-west regions will continue for the foreseeable future, until such time as the Federal Government does what it should have done and establish guidelines on the size of the Administrative area.
    - The tensions between South-West 3; South-West 6; the Shabelle State and the Independent Juba Administration are only set to grow. Potentially we could see a major outbreak of fighting in Lower Shabelle and Bay regions.
    - The proposed central region comprising Galmudug and Himan and Heeb continues, with Ahlu Sunna meeting administration representatives to ensure cooperation from all sides.
    - The tensions between Somaliland and Puntland will, we predict, remain tense, although armed conflict is unlikely, other than local skirmishes, provided Somaliland acts to secure its side of the disputed borders from Al-Shabaab. While both sides believe there is casus belli, open conflict will benefit neither side and would indeed set back the progress Somaliland and Puntland have made.

Security Situation Forecast

The situation in Somalia remains highly dynamic and we cannot see any end to this in sight. During the previous 3 weeks there have been notable success for the SFG and AMISOM and Al-Shabaab have lost key towns. However, Al-Shabaab remains a threat and the loss of towns has not hindered the operational capacity.

AMISOM and Somali National Army Forecast

- The inclusion of Ethiopian forces under AMISOM's mandate in January seems to have not only unified all non-SNA forces in country, but is facilitating AMISOM returning to the offensive.
- AMISOM and the SFG are conducting, or preparing to conduct, campaigns aimed at several Al-Shabaab strongholds;
    - The offensives launched from Ceel Barde; Garbahaarey; Belet Weyne; Marka and Dhuusamarreeb have achieved their initial objectives with the capture of Buurdhuubo; Xudur; Bulo Burto; Qoryooley and Ceel Buur. The Ceel Barde offensive liberated Rab Dhuure and Waajid and the Ceel Buur offensive captured Wabxo.
    - AMISOM and SNA forces have in the last week started spreading out from the main population centres, such as Bulo Burto, to capture smaller subsidiary towns.
    - **Diinsoor-** an AMISOM force in Qansax Dheere is ideally placed to advance on Diinsoor from the north.
        - Qansax Dheere was reinforced on 17.02 with an AMISOM contingent. With the capture of Buurdhuubo from Al-Shabaab on 08.03 it is probable that further Ethiopian forces will reinforce the contingent in Qansax Dheere.
    - **Jalalaqsi** with AMISOM forces advancing from Bulo Burto.
        - Following the capture of Bulo Burto on 13.02 the Belet Weyne offensive has achieved its initial objective. Once the area around Bulo Burto has been stabilised it is likely that the force will then proceed onto Jalaqsi, then possibly Jowhar, trapping the bulk of Al-Shabaab's forces in the south of the country.
    - **Baardheere** is likely to come under pressure from AMISOM forces advancing from Buurdhuubo from the north and a strike from Faafux Dhuun to the west.
        - The capture of Buurdhuubo on 08.03 was made following fighting along the road from Garbahaarey. It is probable that the AMISOM contingent will advance from Buurdhuubo towards Baardheere and also support a thrust from Qansax Dheere on Diinsoor.
        - A second thrust from Faafax Dhuun to the west of Baardheere is developing, with fighting along the road connecting the 2 towns.
    - **Baraawe** with AMISOM forces advancing from Marka.
        - The offensive is reported to have commenced on 10.03. AMISOM captured Qoryooley and have paused to secure the area, before advancing on Baraawe.
        - Should Diinsoor fall it would be possible for AMISOM to advance on Baraawe from the north. This is increasingly likely and with Baraawe intended as a permanent base for AMISOMs Ethiopian contingent it is logical for the Ethiopian's to capture the town.

Al-Shabaab Related Forecast

- The last week has again seen Al-Shabaab forced to withdraw from strategic towns through South-Central, sustaining minimal losses in the process.
    - The Al-Shabaab campaign is evolving from an open war in the south to a guerrilla campaign, allowing Al-Shabaab to continue to influence Somalia without resorting to open warfare and incurring higher casualties.
        - Al-Shabaab was expected to fight to hold the towns under their control, however the emerging pattern is that after putting up resistance their forces withdraw intact and avoid heavy casualties.

        - Once a town has been liberated, Al-Shabaab aim to isolate the town and conduct counter-attacks to pin the AMISOM and SNA forces in place.
        - Immediately prior to their withdrawal, Al-Shabaab also destroy critical infrastructure and plant IEDs to ensure the liberating forces incur casualties.

- Al-Shabaab has effectively divided its insurgency into 3 separate areas with differing strategies in each.
    1. South-Central, Al-Shabaab will attempt to continue to hold key areas, slowly withdrawing as necessary;
    2. Central and North-East areas will see an increase in Al-Shabaab's presence as the move forces and assets to allow continuation of the struggle.
    3. Outside of Somalia we will see Al-Shabaab continue to strike, with AMISOM contributing countries at highest risk of attack.
- **South-Central** will see Al-Shabaab continuing to hold areas currently under it's control, while attempting to expand existing offensive campaigns. Open warfare has been replaced with clandestine activity to reduce casualties.
    - Al-Shabaab is conducting offensive action against;
        - **Kismayo** with Al-Shabaab forces advancing from positions increasingly close to Kismayo.
            - Al-Shabaab has considerable forces in Badhaadhe; Buulo Xaaji; Jana Cabdale and Turdho. These forces are positioned to interdict and harass vehicle traffic moving to and from Kismayo.
        - **Mogadishu** was again the scene of a number of attacks and this will continue for the foreseeable future. Al-Shabaab cannot take the city as it stands, however they can continue to harass and prevent the Federal Government from improving its position.
            - Al-Shabaab operates openly in Daynile; Heliwa and Yaaqshiid with forces there and in several villages to the north-west of Mogadishu AMISOM and SNA traffic is coming under increasing attack travelling in and around Mogadishu.
            - Assassinations; IED attacks and hit and run attacks on AMISOM; SNA and SNP bases have all been seen and are likely to remain tactics used by Al-Shabaab.
    - In other areas of South-Central, Al-Shabaab retains control of several strategically important cities.
        - **Baidoa** remains virtually surrounded with Al-Shabaab defensive positions at Abal and Totiyas and a stronger line from Jilibey to Labaatan Jirow.
            - The area around Idale is home to several Al-Shabaab strongholds and reports indicate further Al-Shabaab movement into the area.
        - Adan Yaabal in Middle Shabelle is increasing in importance for Al-Shabaab providing a rallying point for forces displaced from Ceel-Buur. Control of the area provides bases for ongoing operations and secures a route to move forces north.
        - Jilib; Bu'aale and Jamaame in Middle Juba contain much of the command and control structure of Al-Shabaab, including senior leaders.
        - Al-Shabaab continues to hold several key cities; Baraawe; Diinsoor; Jalalaqsi and Jilib in particular and has over the last few weeks consolidated a proportion of their militia forces in these locations.

Key		Al-Shabaab and AMISOM Offensives	
Objectives		**Al-Shabaab**	
	AMISOM	**Mogadishu**, forces in • Mogadishu; **Kismayo**, forces from; • Turdho; • Jamaame;	
	Al-Shabaab	**Bulo Burto**, forces from; • Jalalaqsi;	
Offensives		**AMISOM**	
	AMISOM	**Ethiopian forces;** • **Diinsoor**, imminent; • **Ceel Buur,** imminent; **Kenyan forces;** • **Baardheere,** imminent;	
	Al-Shabaab	**Ugandan and Burundian forces**; • Baraawe, imminent;	



- **Central and North-East** areas are seeing a significant increase of Al-Shabaab activity, with strong indication that Al-Shabaab is moving forces away from South-Central to seek safe haven and bases to enable continuation of its campaign in the future.
    - We have seen Al-Shabaab create a series of transit routes from South-Central to Central and North-Eastern areas, with Al-Shabaab moving into Adan Yaabal; Xarardheere; Gaalkacyo and Buuhoodle to provide rally points for forces moving north along these routes.
  - In Galmudug. Al-Shabaab's presence is centred on Xarardheere and Gaalkacyo, but there are indications of Al-Shabaab also moving towards Hobyo. The presence in Galmudug is not overt, but a number of smaller towns and villages around population centres play home to Al-Shabaab safe houses and training camps.
    - There are reports that Al-Shabaab has clan links to the Governor of Galmudug, Qeybdiid and despite his public stance of being against Al-Shabaab has gained material support.
  - Puntland- There are indications, including reports from AMISOM and within Al-Shabaab that Al-Shabaab is moving significant forces, including key leaders into the Golis Mountains.
    - There has been a recent increase in fighting between Al-Shabaab and the Puntland Armed Forces, including recent security operations in Bossaso; Garowe and Gaalkacyo.
    - The Puntland Armed Forces have also been active in the Golis Mountains attempting to contain Al-Shabaab's presence.
      - The Puntland Armed Forces campaign against Al-Shabaab in the Golis Mountains was dealt a blow with the recent assassination of Colonel Afgaduud.
        - The Police Commissioner for the Bari region has been arrested for material involvement in the assassination of Colonel Afgaduud, among other offences. It is believed he passed the information to Al-Shabaab about the Colonel's movements prior to his death.
    - The Golis Mountains provides an ideal stronghold for Al-Shabaab to regroup and local military forces lack the ability to clear Al-Shabaab from the Golis Mountains.
    - There are indications of a significant Al-Shabaab infrastructure within the Golis Mountains. It has been suggested that the Golis Mountains are considered to be Al-Shabaab's final stronghold and the recent expansion of facilities seems to confirm this theory.



- Al-Shabaab has repeatedly demonstrated its ability and resolve to look outside Somalia.
    - Al-Shabaab is likely to carry out further attacks outside of Kenya and it is reported that there are Al-Shabaab personnel in Nairobi; Addis Ababa and Kampala. Targets are most likely to be high profile in nature, such as embassies; government buildings and even public places- such as shopping malls.
        - In Kenya there is a large Al-Shabaab presence in the Hagadera Refugee Camp that is used to support operations throughout Kenya.
        - It is believed that as well as providing material support to attacks, Al-Shabaab is believed to recruit members from within Hagadera.
        - Al-Shabaab has also seen an increase of Kenyan recruits in recent months, incidents such as the storming of a Mombasa Mosque, even with overwhelming evidence of Al-Shabaab supporters being present, does nothing to win the hearts and minds battle.
        - The recent Kenyan Government activity against Somalis in Eastleigh is unlikely to materially affect Al-Shabaab. Indications are that the corruption endemic in the Kenyan Police Force has allowed Al-Shabaab figures to escape arrest by paying bribes to Police Officers.
    - There is a high risk of attacks in Uganda.
        - In the last week the Government has warned of at least 2 planned Al-Shabaab attacks in Kampala using VBIEDs. This follows on from warnings of Al-Shabaab plots to attack the energy infrastructure and perhaps use fuel tankers as large VBIEDs in attacks in early March and reports by the US Embassy of the threat of terror attacks on certain high profile locations.
- Al-Shabaab has demonstrated a tactical sophistication and adaptability manifested in its ongoing evolution from an overt organisation into a clandestine, ongoing insurgency.
    - The Al-Shabaab targeted killing program run by the Amniyat branch is probably the biggest threat to future peace and stability in Somalia at present.
        - In recent weeks this program has carried out a number of high profile assassinations or attempted these, including the President of Somalia and various security and government officials.
        - Al-Shabaab has spent the last 2 months training at least 300 Amniyat personnel at camps throughout South-Central, using experienced foreign jihadists as instructors. These Amniyat operatives are being positioned to conduct further targeted killings and IED attacks. Reports of Amniyat personnel being sent to Kenya; Ethiopia and Uganda to conduct attacks have also emerged.
        - Indeed given Al-Shabaab's withdrawal of its militia forces from South-Central it is likely that the Amniyat's role will grow in providing the main striking force for Al-Shabaab in South-Central.
- Strategically we predict that;
    - Continuing AMISOM / SNA success will see Al-Shabaab lose control of all population centres within the next year.

        - However, control of population centres does little to reduce Al-Shabaab's control of rural areas and as a result it's ability to isolate and interdict population centres.
        - Al-Shabaab will continue to surrender territory and withdraw fighting forces to avoid loss of personnel. This will allow Al-Shabaab to continue fighting into the future.
    - Al-Shabaab will continue transforming its fighting forces from militia engaging in open fighting to an insurgent force that acts covertly.
    - It is our estimation that Somalia could continue as a long term counter insurgency fight and while loath to use comparisons, there are considerable similarities with Afghanistan or Iraq.

Threat Forecast

There remains a specific threat against foreign nationals and organisations operating inside Somalia from both criminal and terrorist forces.

- Puntland remains at a high risk of violence in the vicinity of major population centres and roads, even though current levels of violence remain lower than in South Central. Specifically;
    - Caution is advised in the vicinity of Gaalkacyo; Garowe; Bossaso and Qardho.
- In South Central there remains a high level of fighting throughout.
    - Caution is advised in the vicinity of all major cities and along all major roads.
- We would also advise all organisations operating in Somalia to exercise the highest levels of security.
    - All facilities should be hardened to resist terrorist attack, with perimeter security and safe areas in place, measures should also include an adequate guard force and hardening of the buildings structure to resist explosive attacks;;
    - Movement in country should be limited to necessary travel only and should be risk assessed to ensure it is necessary. Movement where possible should be with armed protection and in adequately protected vehicles.
        - If possible movement by air is considered preferable to road movements;
    - Meetings should be conducted in secure facilities only and never in places accessible to the public. Al-Shabaab has demonstrated its ability to conduct strikes targeted at security and international personnel in public areas.
    - In the wake of a recent Al-Shabaab threat we would also recommend international organisations to apply these same security measures to local staff
- While Al-Shabaab is the highest profile threat, it should also be remembered that even in areas outside of Al-Shabaab's control, the threat of clan related violence as well as criminal activity should not be underestimated.
- The lack of government control over large swathes of Somalia allows criminal gangs free reign. Criminal activity ranges from illegal tolls on roads to the kidnap of staff.
- The non-payment of government employees and military personnel by both the Federal Government and the autonomous administrations directly affects the security situation. Unpaid SNA personnel have been directly linked to criminal acts including setting up illegal checkpoints on roads; robbery and kidnapping.